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Abstract
In 1994, Peter Shor has developed a quantum algorithm for integer factorization and the discrete
logarithm problem, known as Shor’s algorithm. This was a great finding in the quantum field,
given that it makes essentially all currently used cryptographic constructions (such as RSA and
ECC) easily breakable by a quantum computer. Since quantum computers are believed to phi-
sically exist in the next few years, these encryption schemes will be no longer reliable, making
the encrypted data compromised.
It is thus of crucial importance to build and analyze new quantum-resistant cryptographic sche-
mes. These new cryptographic constructions should be efficient and secure enough to be used
in practice and standardized for a large number of years, replacing the current ones if needed.
In the last year, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, from U.S. Department
of Commerce) has announced its quest of finding such quantum-resistant cryptographic cons-
tructions.
The NTRU encryption scheme, developed by Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher and Joseph Silverman
(the same Silverman famous for his work on elliptic curves) in the 90’s, presented in 1996 and
published in 1998, is an example of a quantum-resistant proposal. Although it is not supported
with a theoretical security proof, the scrutiny done since its presentation until now reveal that
NTRU is secure and is a good successor for replacing the current constructions currently in use.
It is a fact that there already exist some classical cryptosystems that are quantum-resistant.
The McEliece cryptosystem (1978) is an example of such a quantum-resistant construction, but
it is not good to be used in practice.
The theory behind the NTRU cryptosystem is very simple, therefore easy to understand, and
NTRU can be very easily implemented and put in practice: both private and public keys are
easy and quickly computable, having O(N) length, making a clear difference between the length
O(N2) of other cryptosystems considered as fast, and encrypting and decrypting with NTRU
takes O(N2) operations, which makes it considerably faster than RSA and ECC.
To date, NTRU remains secure against both classical and quantum computers. The most effec-
tive attacks on NTRU are based on lattices, namely using lattice reduction algorithms, which
goal is to find very short vectors in a lattice. One can apply the LLL algorithm (1982) of
Arjen Lenstra, Hendrik Lenstra and László Lovász, which is recognized as a very important
achievement in many areas of mathematics. It runs in polynomial time, but has an exponential
approximation factor. This algorithm was improved over time. The most important improve-
ment is due to Schnorr (1987), who introduced the Blockwise-Korkine-Zolotarev algorithm, also
known as BKZ algorithm, which is to date the best lattice reduction algorithm to be put in
practice. In 2011, Yuanmi Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen improved the BKZ algorithm, revising
lattice security estimates, and created the BKZ simulation algorithm, permitting to predict both
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the output and the running time of the BKZ algorithm without the need of running BKZ, since
in high dimension with blocksize ≥ 45 the running time of BKZ is considerably long. There is
a lot of investigation in this area, mainly because of its cryptographic applications.
This work can be divided in three parts: first, we present a slight and short introduction to
quantum computing, namely the basics of quantum mechanics and the Fourier Transform; se-
condly, we give a sufficient groundwork on lattices, present the LLL and BKZ lattice reduction
algorithms, the BKZ simulation algorithm as well, and give some examples of public-key encryp-
tion schemes; in third place, we give an analysis of the NTRU cryptosystem, focusing mainly
on lattice-based attacks. Finally, as work to do in the future, we present an idea of a quantum
algorithm for lattice reduction.
Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography; Quantum Computing; Lattice-based Cryptography;
Lattice reduction algorithms; NTRU Public-Key Cryptosystem.
Resumo
Em 1994, Peter Shor desenvolveu um algoritmo quântico para a factorização de inteiros e para o
problema do logaritmo discreto, fazendo de ambos RSA e ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) fa-
cilmente quebráveis por computadores quânticos. Como se acredita que computadores quânticos
irão fisicamente existir nos próximos poucos anos, quase toda a informação encriptada deixará de
estar segura, e o impacto na vida prática das pessoas será no mı́nimo devastador. Aspetos como
a comunicação entre pessoas, empresas e governos, operações bancárias, comércio eletrónico,
passwords, entre muitos outros, estarão comprometidos. A criptografia de chave pública é hoje
indispensável para indiv́ıduos ou entidades comunicarem em segurança, logo, a existência de
computadores quânticos constitui uma enorme ameaça para a nossa criptografia moderna.
Caso computadores quânticos venham realmente a existir, substituir os atuais criptossistemas em
uso vai ser algo necessário, uma vez que os criptossistemas resistentes a computadores quânticos
em uso estão muito longe de ser suficientemente eficientes para serem postos em prática. É
portanto imperativo estudar criptossistemas candidatos a substituir os atuais em termos da sua
eficiência, praticidade e segurança contra ambos computadores clássicos e quânticos. Em 2016, o
NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology, instituto do Departamento do Comércio
dos EUA, anunciou a sua busca por tais construções criptográficas resistentes a computadores
quânticos. Estas devem ser eficientes e suficientemente boas para ser adotadas por um largo
número de anos. Este instituto prevê a chegada de computadores quânticos para 2030, o que
revela que existe pouco tempo para estudar as eventuais propostas de substituição aos criptossis-
temas atuais. Além disso, esta substituição demorará certamente o seu tempo, de maneira que
se deve começar já a investir na busca de construções criptográficas resistentes a computadores
quânticos.
Desenvolvido por Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher e Joseph Silverman (o mesmo Silverman famoso
pelo seu trabalho em curvas eĺıticas) nos anos 90, apresentado na conferencia internacional de
criptologia CRYPTO ‘96 e publicado em 1998, o criptossistema NTRU é um exemplo de um
criptossistema resistente à computação quântica com potencial para vir a substituir os atuais
criptossistemas clássicos em uso. Embora seja considerado um criptossistema baseado em re-
ticulados, a sua descrição original não os usa, ainda que seja posśıvel descrevê-lo inteiramente
usando-os. Ainda assim, no artigo onde vem apresentado constam ataques baseados em reticu-
lados que aproveitam certos aspetos que lhe são intŕınsecos.
A teoria por detrás do criptossistema NTRU é bastante simples, dado que se baseia em álgebra
polinomial e na redução módulo dois inteiros primos entre si. O criptossistema NTRU é, por-
tanto, muito fácil de ser compreendido, implementado, e de ser posto em prática: ambas as cha-
ves pública e privada são rapidamente computáveis, tendo comprimento O(N), fazendo clara
distinção com as chaves de comprimento O(N2) de outros criptossistemas ditos rápidos, tais
como os criptossistemas McEliece e GGH, e encriptar e desencriptar com o criptossistema NTRU
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leva O(N2) operações, o que faz do mesmo consideravelmente mais rápido que o criptossistema
RSA e a criptografia baseada em curvas eĺıticas. Além disto, o criptossistema NTRU é consi-
derado como sendo um criptossistema probabiĺıstico, uma vez que usa um elemento aleatório
para encriptar uma mensagem. Desse modo, uma mensagem pode ter múltiplas encriptações
posśıveis.
Desde a publicação do criptossistema NTRU, foram emitidos alguns relatórios técnicos, alguns
consistindo em algoritmos que permitiram o criptossistema NTRU ganhar eficiência, outros des-
crevendo melhoramentos de ataques já existentes e também novos ataques e posśıveis soluções
para os contornar. A análise de segurança feita até hoje, incluindo por criptógrafos reconhecidos
como Don Coppersmith, Johan H̊astad, Andrew Odlyzho e Adi Shamir, deu ao criptossistema
NTRU um estatuto de legitimidade e contribuiu para futura investigação, dado que o criptos-
sistema NTRU se revelou interessante e promissor. Contudo, a análise realizada até hoje não
implicou alterações profundas na estrutura do criptossistema NTRU, embora parâmetros mais
largos tenham sido recomendados ao longo do tempo para alcançar os ńıveis de segurança de-
sejados. Apesar de não ser acompanhado de uma prova de segurança, o criptossistema NTRU
tem-se revelado seguro, uma vez que nenhum ataque quer clássico quer quântico com impacto
significativo no criptossistema foi encontrado, o que revela que é uma boa alternativa aos crip-
tossistemas clássicos em uso.
O nosso estudo do criptossistema NTRU começou por explorar a página da companhia Security
Innovation, onde se pode encontrar uma breve introdução à criptografia pós-quântica e um v́ıdeo
que explica o porquê da mesma ser estudada. Esta página contém um vasto número de recur-
sos, incluindo tutoriais, surveys, relatórios técnicos, resumos e artigos, assim como uma vasta
lista de artigos que escrutinam o criptossistema NTRU. De modo a aprofundar o estudo do
criptossistema NTRU, explorámos e investigámos uma grande parte da documentação existente
nesta página. Existe, como se pode constatar, uma quantidade tremenda de documentação para
analisar, e devido a limitações no tempo optámos por estudar o criptossistema NTRUEncrypt,
começando pelas suas ráızes.
Em 1997, Don Coppersmith e Adi Shamir fizeram a primeira análise de segurança ao criptossis-
tema NTRU, em que descobriram que o método de ataque mais eficaz contra o criptossistema
consistia em algoritmos de redução de reticulados com vista a encontrar vetores muito curtos
numa classe particular de reticulados. Até à data, este é o método de ataque mais eficaz ao crip-
tossistema NTRU. A segurança do criptossistema NTRU tem como base evidências emṕıricas,
que mostra que encontrar vetores muito curtos num reticulado é um problema dif́ıcil, especial-
mente quando a dimensão do reticulado é muito grande.
O estudo dos reticulados, denominado Geometria dos Números por Minkowski, data anterior-
mente das suas aplicações criptográficas e é uma área que contribuiu para o desenvolvimento
de muitas outras, tais como a f́ısica, análise, álgebra e geometria. Este é um tópico bastante
estudado, principalmente devido às aplicações dos algoritmos de redução de reticulados. Como
a segurança do NTRU depende principalmente de ataques baseados em reticulados, criámos
um caṕıtulo inteiro dedicado aos reticulados e a algoritmos de redução de reticulados. Um im-
portante avanço nesta área foi o algoritmo LLL (por vezes chamado algoritmo L3) de Lenstra,
Lenstra e Lovász em 1982, desenvolvido antes dos reticulados serem considerados relevantes em
criptografia. Este algoritmo permite encontrar um vetor moderadamente curto num reticulado
em tempo polinomial. Com o passar do tempo, este algoritmo foi melhorado, dando origem ao
algoritmo BKZ (Blockwise-Korkine-Zolotarev), que é até hoje na prática o melhor algoritmo
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de redução de reticulados permitindo encontrar vetores muito curtos em reticulados. Este al-
goritmo deve-se a Schnorr (1987), no entanto não é executado em tempo polinomial. Portanto,
encontrar vetores muito curtos num reticulado de larga dimensão continua a ser um problema
em aberto. Em 2011, Yuanmi Chen e Phong Q. Nguyen criaram um algoritmo que permite
simular o algoritmo BKZ, denominado BKZ simulation algorithm, podendo prever aproximada-
mente o output e o tempo de execução do algoritmo BKZ.
Este trabalho foi dividido em três partes. A primeira é uma pequena introdução à computação
quântica, principalmente aos básicos da mecânica quântica e à Transformada de Fourier, uma
vez que alguns leitores poderão não conhecer estes conteúdos. Além disso, algumas noções
de computação quântica são mencionadas neste trabalho, pelo que faz todo o sentido incluir
uma breve referência às mesmas. A segunda parte trata de reticulados em geral, apresenta os
algoritmos de redução de reticulados LLL e BKZ (juntamente com o BKZ simulation algorithm)
e também alguns exemplos de criptossistemas de chave pública que se baseiam em reticulados.
A terceira parte revela uma análise do criptossistema NTRU, focando-se principalmente em
ataques baseados em reticulados, que são os que de longe melhor se aplicam aos reticulados
associados ao criptossistema NTRU. Como perspetiva de trabalho futuro, apresenta-se uma
ideia de um algoritmo quântico para a redução de reticulados.
Palavras-Chave: Criptografia Pós-Quântica; Computação Quântica; Criptografia Baseada em Reti-
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Developed by Jefferey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher and Joseph Silverman (the same Silverman famous
for his work on elliptic curves) in the 90’s, presented in the rump session of CRYPTO ‘96 and
published in 1998, the NTRU cryptosystem is an example of a quantum-resistant cryptosystem
with the potential to eventually replace the classical cryptosystems in use. This is thus an
interesting cryptographic construction to be studied, but not only for this reason. Although
it is considered as a lattice-based cryptosystem, its original description does not use lattices,
even if it is possible to entirely describe it with lattices. Still, in its original publication [15] it
is presented a lattice-based attack, taking advantage of key, message and random element spaces.
The theory behind the NTRU cryptosystem is very simple, since it is based in polynomial al-
gebra and reduction modulo two relatively prime integers p and q. The NTRU cryptosystem
is therefore easy to understand and, in addition, NTRU can be very easily implemented and
put in practice: both private and public keys are easy and quickly computable, having O(N)
length, making a clear difference between the length O(N2) of other cryptosystems considered
as fast, such as McEliece and GGH cryptosystems, and encrypting and decrypting with NTRU
takes O(N2) operations, which makes it considerably faster than RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve
Cryptography) which encrypt and decrypt in O(N3) operations. Some of the advantages of
NTRU (implementation, usability and performance levels) can be found in [33].
Besides, NTRU is considered as a probabilistic cryptosystem, since it uses a random element
to encrypt a message, making the same message having multiple possible encryptions. Because
of this, decryption may result in error, with probability depending on the choice of parameters.
With elementary probability, one can study the probability of getting decryption errors with a
chosen set of parameters. This is very important, since decryption errors can potentially reveal
to an attacker some information about the message or the private key. However, to date this is
not a problem, as we will remark in Chapters 3 and 4.
Since the publication of NTRU, NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc., in 2009 acquired by Security Inno-
vation, a software security company, has uploaded some technical reports, some of then consisting
on algorithms which allowed NTRU to have better efficiency, and others describing improved or
new attacks and possible solutions.
Despite of not having a security proof, the NTRU cryptosystem has revealed to be secure. The
security analysis done until now, including by recognized cryptographers such as Don Coppers-
mith, Johan H̊astad, Andrew Odlyzho and Adi Shamir, gave to NTRU a legitimate status and
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contributed to further investigation, since NTRU has revealed to be interesting and promising.
However, this analysis done until now did not suggested a profound change of the core idea and
the scheme of NTRU, although larger parameters have been recommended in order to achieve
the desired security levels. In 1997, Coppersmith and Shamir did the first analysis security of
NTRU [6], in which they found that the most effective attacks on NTRU were based on lattices,
using lattice reduction algorithms to find very short vectors in a special type of lattices, revising
the security levels of the original parameter settings. So far, these presented lattice attacks and
their amplifications remain the most effective on NTRU. Although lattices associated to NTRU
have a special structure, the best attacks are also the best attacks on random lattices. However,
it is not known if breaking NTRU is equivalent to being able to solve the underlying lattice
problem for random lattices. The same goes for RSA: it is not known if classically breaking
RSA is equivalent to being able to efficiently factorize.
The security of NTRU relies on empirical evidence, which shows that this underlying lattice pro-
blem of finding very short lattice vectors is hard, specially when the dimension of such lattices
is very high. However, the fact of being based on experimental evidence is similar to the current
cryptographic constructions in use. RSA and ECC are classically considered secure, since there
is no classical efficient algorithm for integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem.
Furthermore, such efficient classical algorithm are not even in sight.
The study of lattices, called Geometry of Numbers by Minkowski, dates back before their appli-
cation in cryptography, and is an area of mathematics that has contributed to many other areas,
such as physics, analysis, algebra and geometry. This topic is intensively studied, specially be-
cause of lattice reduction applications. An important achievement in this area, and perhaps the
most important, is the LLL algorithm (sometimes called L3 algorithm) of Lenstra, Lenstra and
Lovász, described in [21]. This algorithm is able to find a moderately short vector in a lattice
in polynomial time, but has an exponential approximation factor, i.e., in high dimension, short
vectors found by this algorithm are usually very far from the shorter vectors in the lattice. The
LLL algorithm was improved over time, giving rise to the well-known BKZ algorithm, which is
until today the best algorithm to be put in practice for finding very short vectors in a lattice
in high dimension. However, the BKZ algorithm does not run in polynomial time, because it
is based on mixing LLL and an exact algorithm. Hence as the dimension increases, its running
time increases exponentially. Therefore, finding very short vectors in a lattice in sufficiently
high dimension remains an open problem.
Since the physical existence of quantum computers is a threat to our modern cryptography,
which is nowadays indispensable, being able to break almost all cryptosystems currently being
used, such as RSA and ECC, it is of utmost importance to cryptanalyze the existing quantum-
resistant proposals and to possibly build new more efficient and secure quantum-resistant cryp-
tographic schemes. Once quantum computers come up, which is expected to be very soon,
almost all encrypted data will be no longer safe, and the impact in practical life of all people
would be devastating. Secure communications between people, governments and financial/non-
financial companies, bank operations, passwords, e-commerce, data confidentiality and so on
would be compromised. To prevent this catastrophic armageddon scenery, some agencies, such
as NIST (National institute of Standards and Technology, from U.S. Department of Commerce)
are already preparing the possible switch of current security protocols to quantum-resistant ones.
Therefore, post-quantum cryptography, or quantum-resistant cryptography, which is essentially
the study of cryptographic schemes which are believed to be secure against both classical and
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quantum algorithms, is a very important area of study.
1.1 Organization
Our study of the NTRU cryptosystem began with exploring the website [34]. On this page we
can find a small introduction for post-quantum cryptography [38], and where we can find a short
video which briefly explains why post-quantum cryptography is widely studied. Security Inno-
vation’s webpage contains a large number of resources [35], including tutorials, survey articles,
technical reports, abstracts and articles, and contains as well a list of articles that scrutinize
the NTRU cryptosystem [36]. In order to deepen the study of the NTRU cryptosystem we
explored and investigated a great part of the documentation in these pages. There is of course
a tremendous amount of documentation to analyse, and due to time limitations we choose to
study NTRUEncrypt, beginning by its roots.
As the security analysis of NTRU depends primarily on lattice-based attacks, we made an entire
chapter focusing on lattices and and lattice reduction algorithms. In this same chapter, we
give other examples of lattice-based cryptosystems, such as the GGH/HNF and the LWE-Based
cryptosystems. In the following chapter that we reserved for the security analysis of NTRU-
Encrypt, we give special attention to lattice attacks, the ones that better and by far applies
to NTRU lattices. We also study other not so effective attacks, but still important and inte-
resting. Furthermore, we compare NTRU with other well known cryptosystems, such as RSA,
ECC and McEliece. We emphasize that the study of NTRUEncrypt that we make in this work
is based on the original construction given in [13] and [15], and that the current construction is
quite different, adjusted to resist, for example, to chosen ciphertext attacks, so many of the pre-
sented attacks are no longer functional. Nevertheless, the underlying lattice problem is the same.
We give a small introduction to quantum computing, that can be found in [2], [26] and [48].
Although this introduction is not very detail-oriented, we have decided to include a chapter
devoted to this subject since some readers may not be familiar with these contents. Besides,
some notions of quantum computing are mentioned in this work, and it made perfect sense to
include them here. In the last chapter, we present an idea of a quantum algorithm for lattice
reduction and also some prospects for future work.
1.2 Contributions
The major contributions of this work, although very modest, are listed in the following topics:
1. In Section 3, we proved all that we considered necessary. In particular, in Corollary 1 of
Section 3.2.1 we proved the third statement, which was already known, still we did not
find a proof for it;
2. In Section 3.2.2, we try to explain in detail the BKZ algorithm more clearly than in [5] and
[30]. We did the same for the BKZ simulation algorithm, which is not entirely explained
in [5]. Although [30] has served as a reference, there are some unclear statements that we
try to explain in a better way, such as the volume calculation of local projected lattices;
3. In Section 3.3.3, we try to explain in more detail some omitted calculations in [2];
4. In the security analysis of NTRU, we explain the need for taking parameters p and q
relatively prime, since all references that describe this only mention the case p | q;
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5. In Section 4.1.3, we state that | |2 and | |∞ are both seminorms, which is not stated in all
references that we found about this;
6. We implemented in Matlab Proposition 6 of Section 4.1.3, giving different constants γ1
and γ2 than the ones given in [15];
7. In Section 4.1.6, we give an example for the meet-in-the-middle attack;
8. In Section 4.1.9, we explain in a better way how constants ch and cm are found, given that
in [13] and [15] there were missing some steps;
9. Finally, in Chapter 5 we present an idea for a quantum algorithm to solve SVP in generic
lattices, although it has to be studied in more detail and with more time.
Chapter 2
Quantum Computing
The security of classical public-key schemes relies on the hardness of solving certain number the-
ory problems. However, with the introduction of quantum algorithms and quantum computers,
some of them are no longer secure. However, there are some known cryptographic constructions
that resist to such quantum algorithms, so even if quantum computers become a reality, infor-
mation security is preserved.
Such quantum-resistant constructions, such as hash-based cryptography, code-based cryptography,
lattice-based cryptography (which will be our focus), multivariate-quadratic-equations crypto-
graphy and secret-key cryptography, are believed to be secure against both classical and quantum
computers, based on the hardness of solving the underlying number theory problems in both
classical and quantum settings.
For all these classes of quantum-resistant constructions, it is unknown how to apply the exis-
ting quantum algorithms (such as Shor’s algorithm1, for integer factorization and the discrete
logarithm problem, and Grover’s algorithm2, for searching a certain item in an unordered space
with a finite number of elements) and making new algorithms for breaking any of these classes
of constructions seems to be difficult.
Since quantum computers are expected to exist in few years from now, it is of extreme im-
portance to study those cryptographic constructions classes. Ideally, the goal would be to find
a devastating attack for a construction, such as Shor’s algorithm for factorization, making it
totally insecure and therefore useless, or more modestly to find an attack that forces to large
key sizes, such as Grover’s algorithm.
The security of some cryptosystems relies exclusively on the experimental evidence done, but
others have theoretical security proofs which makes them considered as being more secure than
the previous ones. However, these security proofs are based on the hardness of solving some
number theory problem, where it is unknown if this problem is actually hard to solve. Therefore,
the security of these cryptosystems is due to the lack of knowledge of effective attacks on their
underlying problem.
1The best classical algorithm for integer factorization runs in O(exp(c(logN)1/3(log logN)2/3)), where N is
the integer to factorize and c is a constant. It is known as number field sieve. Shor’s algorithm breaks factorization
in O((logN)2(log logN)(log log logN)) time.
2Grover’s algorithm has time complexity O(
√
N), where N is the number of elements in the search space.
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If quantum computers become a reality, replacing the current cryptographic constructions will
be something necessary, since the current quantum-resistant schemes are too far of being effi-
cient to be put in practice. For example, the McEliece cryptosystem could never be used in
practice, since its keys would be of a few million bits. It is thus important to improve the known
quantum-resistant cryptographic constructions in terms of their efficiency, security and practi-
cality, or if necessary to build new secure, efficient and practical quantum-resistant schemes.
Still, no one knows if this replacement will be actually necessary. No one actually knows if the
study of post-quantum cryptography is needed, since no one knows if quantum computers will
physically exist or not. However, it is believed that it is a question of time and money until a
large quantum computer appears (NIST believes that they will be built by 2030 for the price of
one billion dollars). Such large quantum computers would be able to break RSA-2048 in a few
hours, so larger key sizes for all current cryptographic constructions would be required, and by
this way the efficiency of all current cryptographic constructions would collapse.
Briefly, quantum computers are a threat to our modern cryptography, and we are not ready to
replace the currently used cryptosystems by quantum-resistant and efficient ones, since more
study is required to build trust in these constructions and since it would take a considerable time
to exchange them. Although no one can assure that quantum computers will come up by the
next few years, it is of critical importance to develop research in post-quantum cryptography,
to not be caught off guard in the case of quantum computers suddenly arise.
2.1 Classical Cryptography and Quantum Computing
In 1994, Peter Shor developed a quantum algorithm for integer factorization and the discrete
logarithm problem, making RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange breakable by a quantum
computer. Because of this, new problems difficult to solve by quantum computers are required
in order to build new cryptographic schemes. However, this difficulty assumption is based on
experimental evidence, which means that whatever cryptographic construction is chosen, its
security depends on the security of the underlying problem, which is entirely based on empirical
evidence. For example, RSA is considered secure in the classical setting because factoring is
computationally hard. As we will observe, NTRU is considered secure in the classical setting
because its underlying lattice problem is computationally hard, and is considered secure in the
quantum setting because there is no efficient quantum attacks against it.
The design of new quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes can be a difficult assignment, spe-
cially because of quantum computation rules. It is believed that NP-complete problems do not
induce good cryptographic constructions, and on the other hand it is not believed that quantum
computers can efficiently solve NP-complete problems. In addition, applying the known results
of quantum computing in cryptanalysis is, in practice, very difficult. For example, Shor’s algo-
rithm uses Quantum Fourier Transforms (QFTs) to break the integer factorization problem in
the quantum setting, but QFTs seem not to be applicable to other problems, such as lattice-
based ones. This is why Shor’s algorithm is a remarkable result in cryptography. Today, there
are multiple efficient quantum algorithms for solving some problems in the most diverse areas,
but the list of such problems is still small when compared with the list of problems which lack
of an efficient quantum algorithm.
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RSA public-key encryption Yes
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange Yes
Elliptic curve cryptography Yes
McEliece public-key encryption Not yet
NTRU public-key encryption Not yet
Lattice-based public-key encryption Not yet
As said before, if the need to change current cryptosystems for quantum-resistant ones arises,
the candidates must be extremely reliable and efficient to be standardized for a large number
of years. However, the currently known cryptosystems that are quantum-resistant have larger
key sizes when compared to classical ones, as we will see in Chapter 4. Although many of these
cryptosystems date are before 2000, so more scrutiny is needed. NIST is now preparing for
a quantum-resistant transition, opening on Fall 2016 a call for proposals of quantum-resistant
public-key, digital signature and key exchange protocols. The deadline for submissions is No-
vember 2017, and in the next three to five years there will be an analysis phase, where the
proposals will be subject of public scrutiny, in which NIST will report its findings. After that
time, NIST may decide whether to standardize or not the considered algorithms. This timeline
may potentially be changed if the developments in the field justify so.
It is worth mentioning that this is not a competition. After the public analysis phase, NIST may
choose more than one presented construction to be standardized, this in the ideal case, since
there is a possibility of none being. The received proposals will be evaluated based on three
elements: security, cost (computational efficiency and memory requirements) and the algorithm
itself and its implementation characteristics (ease of implementation, ease of use, simplicity,
among others). Therefore, there is a possibility of changing the current security protocols in the
next few years, so agencies should be prepared for this transition.
2.2 Quantum Mechanics
These next sections intend to introduce the basics of quantum mechanics, memory and compu-
ting, showing what is and what is not allowed in quantum computing.
We define a pure quantum state |φ〉 (or simply a state) as a superposition of N classical states.
Such classical states will be denoted by |1〉, . . . , |N〉, and we write
|φ〉 = α1|1〉+ · · ·+ αN |N〉,
where α1, . . . , αN ∈ C. The value αi ∈ C is called the amplitude of |i〉 in |φ〉.
For example, consider the classical states |A〉 and |B〉 defined as dead and alive, respectively.
Hence a cat in the quantum state α|A〉 + β|B〉 is dead and alive at the same time (dead with
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amplitude α and alive with amplitude β).
Now that we have defined what quantum states are, we will describe what kind of operations
we can apply to them. There are only two possibilities: either measure the quantum state, or
make it evolve to another quantum state by applying a unitary operator.
2.2.1 Measurement
Consider the cat’s example given above. If the cat is in the quantum state |Ψ〉 = α|A〉+ β|B〉,
we cannot actually see if the cat is dead or not, since it is dead and alive at the same time.
Let us define what is measuring a quantum state |φ〉 = α1|1〉 + · · · + αN |N〉. We can define
it as a correspondence that when given a quantum state |φ〉 = α1|1〉 + · · · + αN |N〉, outputs a
classical state |j〉 with probability |αj |2. Hence,
N∑
j=1
|αj |2 = 1,
which implies that ‖(α1, . . . , αN )‖ = 1.








A priori, the result of measuring |Ψ〉 is unknown, but the cat is more likely to be alive. When
we measure |Ψ〉, we will see the classical state |A〉 or |B〉, and know if the cat is really dead or
alive.
When we measure a quantum state |φ〉 and see the resultant classical state |j〉, we say that |φ〉
has collapsed and no more operations can be done to the result of the measurement.
2.2.2 Unitary Evolution
A quantum state |φ〉 = α1|1〉 + · · · + αN |N〉 can change to another quantum state |ψ〉 =
β1|1〉 + · · · + βN |N〉 in time, but only linear operations are allowed on quantum states, i.e.,
viewing |φ〉 and |ψ〉 as N -dimensional vectors (α1, . . . , αN ) and (β1, . . . , βN ) respectively, the












where U ∈ CN×N . By linearity, we have
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By measuring |ψ〉, we must obtain
N∑
j=1
|βj |2 = 1,
so U preserves the euclidean norm of vectors, and therefore must be unitary. Since a unitary
operator has an inverse, we conclude that all non-measuring operation done to a quantum state











It is clear that measuring a quantum state is not reversible, because we cannot reconstruct the
vector of amplitudes (α1, . . . , αN ).
2.3 Quantum Memory
In contrast with classical computers which use the bit as basic unit of information, quantum
computers work with quantum bits (or simply qubits). A qubit is a superposition of the classical
bits 0 and 1, say α|0〉+ β|1〉, where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Hence every qubit can be viewed as a unit
vector in the Hilbert space
H = H1 = C⊕ C.
We will consider its standard basis, consisting on the vectors (1, 0) and (0, 1), and assign |0〉 to
(1, 0) and |1〉 to (0, 1).
We define a n-qubit as a superposition of all possible n-bits and write it as∑
i1,...,in∈{0,1}
αi1,...,in |i1 · · · in〉,
where ∑
i1,...,in∈{0,1}
|αi1,...,in |2 = 1.
Similarly, every n-qubit can be viewed as a unit vector in the Hilbert space
Hn = H⊗n,
which has as standard basis the vectors |i1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |in〉, where i1, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1}. Hence we
assign |i1 · · · in〉 to |i1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |in〉.
To ease notation, sometimes we write |i1 · · · in〉 as |(i1 · · · in)10〉, where ( )10 is the representation
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in base 10. Therefore a n-qubit can be written as




|αj |2 = 1.
2.4 Elementary Gates
A gate is a unitary operator that acts on n-qubits with n small. It is the quantum counterpart
of the classical logic gates AND, OR and NOT. We will represent these gates with matrices, so
recall the definition of a kronecker product of matrices.




























The Hadamard gate is one of the most important gates, since when we measure a quantum
state, all classical states have equal probability of being observed. In Chapter 5 we will use
these such a gate for our lattice reduction quantum algorithm attempt. The 1-qubit Hadamard
























Similarly, we can define the n-qubit Hadamard gate recursively as












1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1









CNOT|1〉|b〉 = |0〉|1− b〉.
2.5 The Fourier Transform
2.5.1 The Classical Discrete Fourier Transform









where ωN = e
2πi/N . If N = 2, we get the 1-qubit Hadamard gate
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For any vector v ∈ RN , it is said that v̂ = FNv is the Discrete Fourier Transform of v. Doing







2.5.2 The Fast Fourier Transform
The previous naive calculation of v̂ = FNv takes O(N) operations for each coordinate, thus
O(N2) are required to compute v̂. However, there is a method to efficiently compute v̂ that
takes only O(N logN) operations, called the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). When N is too
large, this speedup is shown to be of great importance in practice.
From now on, we will suppose that N is a power of 2. This is not really necessary, but the













































































where v̂even is the FFT of the vector of even-numbered entries of v and v̂odd is the FFT of vector
of odd-numbered entries of v.
The required time to compute the FFT of v̂ is therefore T (N) = 2T (N/2) + O(N), and using
Wolfram|Alpha we can conclude that T (N) = O(N logN). For the same reason, the inverse
Fourier Transform, whose matrix is F−1N = F
∗
N , is also computed in O(N logN) operations.
Let us give an example of application of FFTs. Let P (X), Q(X) ∈ R[X] such that deg(P ), deg(Q) ≤
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where ak = bk = 0 for k > d and bl−k = 0 if k > l;
2. Define N = 2d+ 1 and set a = (a0, . . . , ad, 0, . . . , 0) and b = (b0, . . . , bd, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN ;
3. Compute â and b̂;
4. Compute â ∗ b, where ∗ is a convolution product defined by






There are two things to remark about this convolution product:




5. Apply the inverse FFT to â ∗ b to get a ∗ b;
6. Multiply a ∗ b by
√
N in order to get the coefficients cl.
2.5.3 The Quantum Fourier Transform
When N = 2n, the matrix FN can be can be seen as a quantum operation on quantum states
as in Section 2.2.2, given that FN is unitary. The n-qubit unitary operator with matrix FN ,






is called the Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT).
2.6 The No-Go Theorems
In the quantum setting, some situations of classical computation are not possible. Some of these
situations, often called no-go theorems, can be stated as in the following theorems. We only
present two well-known no-go theorems, since we are not going to need them further on. We
also remark that we only prove the first presented theorem, since the other proof is very similar.
Theorem 1 (No-cloning). There is no unitary matrix U such that, for all quantum state |φ〉,
U |φ〉|0〉 = |φ〉|φ〉.
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Proof. Let |φ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 be an arbitrary quantum state. Suppose that there exists a unitary
matrix U such that
U |φ〉|0〉 = |φ〉|φ〉.
Therefore,
U |φ〉|0〉 = U (α|0〉+ β|1〉) |0〉




U |φ〉|0〉 = |φ〉|φ〉
= (α|0〉+ β|1〉)(α|0〉+ β|1〉)
= α2|00〉+ αβ(|01〉+ |10〉) + β2|11〉.
Hence αβ = 0, so α = 0 or β = 0, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 2 (No-deletion). There is no unitary matrix U such that, for all quantum states |φ〉
and |ψ〉,
U |φ〉|φ〉|ψ〉 = |φ〉|0〉|ψ′〉.
Chapter 3
Lattice-based Cryptography
Lattice-based cryptography is a relatively new area of research that started with the work of
Ajtai, who was the first using lattices for cryptography purposes. Despite of being recent, this
area is nowadays very studied.
Although it has not been proved, it is believed that lattice-based cryptographic constructions are
quantum-resistant. In addition to that, these constructions demarcate up for their simplicity,
efficiency in implementation, and for their security proofs based on worst-case hardness. This
means that breaking such a cryptosystem (even with small probability) would imply solving any
instance of the underlying lattice problem.
The presumed hardness of certain lattice problem is the base of lattice-based cryptosystems.
One of them is the shortest vector problem (SVP), whose statement is: given an arbitrary basis
for a lattice, find the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice. Notice that referring to the shortest
vector in a lattice is an abuse of terminology, since this vector is required not to be the trivial
one (the zero vector) and since there are at least two shortest vectors in a lattice (if v is the
shortest vector in a lattice, then −v is also a shortest vector in the same lattice).
For solving such lattice problems, there is a well known and widely studied algorithm developed
in 1982 by Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász, called LLL algorithm, with many applications, such as
factoring polynomials over Q [21] and break special cases of RSA. For that reason, this algorithm
(and others) has a major role in public-key cryptanalysis. The LLL algorithm runs in polyno-
mial time for SVP and achieves an approximation factor of 2O(n) where n is the dimension of
the lattice.
Later in 1987, Schnorr presented the BKZ algorithm, which is an extension of the LLL algorithm
for solving SVP that leads to shorter vectors. However, the running time of this algorithm in-
creases significantly with the choice of better parameters. Still, this is the best lattice reduction
algorithm known in practice for high dimension.
There is also a variant of Schnorr’s algorithm, the slide reduction algorithm of Gama and Nguyen
[9], which is in theory the best approximation algorithm, yet outperformed by BKZ.
The LLL and BKZ algorithms are approximation algorithms, but we can find some exact algo-
rithms that output the shortest vector of the lattice (or at least nearly shortest vectors). As
we will see, BKZ algorithm has a subroutine algorithm called Enum, which is an enumeration
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algorithm that is exact. Having these two types of algorithms, approximate and exact ones, we
can combine both as evidenced by the BKZ algorithm.
Exact algorithms for lattice problems generally run in at least exponential time. The best known
today is given in [1], exponential in time and space. Therefore, exact algorithms are impractical
when the lattice dimensions are sufficiently high. Other algorithms run in polynomial space,
yet run in 2O(n logn) time. With no polynomial time algorithm known until today, it is believed
that lattice-based cryptographic constructions are secure.
Such cryptographic constructions can be divided into practical ones and ones with strong security
proofs. The reason why this division is possible is because efficient cryptographic constructions
often lack of security proofs, and cryptographic constructions with strong security proofs are
often not very efficient to be considered in practice.
This short introduction bespeaks that lattice problems are quite hard in a classical setting,
but even for quantum computers these problems are hard. Until today, no efficient quantum
algorithms are known. The first connection between lattice problems and quantum algorithms
was done in [28], but no newsworthy efficient quantum algorithms came up from it. The existing
quantum algorithms for lattice problems perform not much better than the existing classical
ones. All knowledge on quantum computation seems to be not applicable in lattice problems,
and therefore finding polynomial time quantum algorithms for lattice problems remains an open
problem. Hereupon, it is believed that lattice-based cryptographic constructions are quantum-
resistant.
3.1 Groundwork
A lattice is defined as the set of all integer combinations of n linearly independent vectors (over
R) b1, . . . , bn ∈ Rn. Given n linearly independent vectors (over R) b1, . . . , bn ∈ Rn, we define the
lattice generated by b1, . . . , bn as the set




xibi : x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z
}
.
The set of vectors b1, . . . , bn is called a basis of the lattice. A basis can be represented by a matrix
B = [b1, . . . , bn] ∈ Rn×n having the basis vectors as columns. To ease notation, we write L(B)
for L(b1, . . . , bn) and say that L(B) is the lattice generated by B. Hence L(B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn}.
A lattice can have multiple bases, as enunciated by the next proposition. This fact is the essence
of many cryptosystems, as we will evidence in section 3.3.
Proposition 1. Let L(B), L(B′) be two lattices with B,B′ ∈ Rn×n as bases, respectively.
1. If U is a unimodular matrix, then U−1 is unimodular;
2. L(B) = L(B′) if and only if there exists a unimodular matrix U such that B′ = BU .
Proof. 1. Recall that U is said to be unimodular if it is an integer square matrix satisfying
det(U) = ±1. Since U is unimodular, U ∈ Zn×n and det(U) = ±1. Then U is invertible
and det(U−1) = det(U)−1 = ±1. By the identity U−1 = det(U)−1 · adj(U) and since the
entries of adj(U) are integers, we get U−1 ∈ Zn×n.
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1, . . . , b
′
n ∈ L(B′) = L(B).
Hence there exists U ∈ Zn×n such that B′ = BU . By the same way, there exists V ∈
Zn×n such that B = B′V . Therefore B′ = BU = B′V U . Taking determinants, we get
det(B′) = det(B′) · det(V U). Thus det(V U) = 1 and we get det(U) = ±1.
Suppose now that there exists a unimodular matrix U such that B′ = BU . Writing
B′ = [b′1, . . . , b
′
n], we have b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n ∈ L(B) since U is an integer matrix. Therefore
L(B′) ⊆ L(B). Since B = B′U−1 and U−1 is unimodular, by the same way we get
L(B) ⊆ L(B′).
The determinant of a lattice L is defined as det(L) = |det(B)|, where B is a basis of L. The va-
lue of the determinant is independent of the choice of the basis. To see this, we consider another
basis B′ of L, write B′ = BU where U is unimodular, and find that det(L) = | det(B′)| =
| det(BU)| = | det(B) · det(U)| = | ± det(B)| = |det(B)|. Geometrically, this value corresponds
to the inverse of the density of the lattice points in Rn.
The dual of a lattice L ⊆ Rn, denoted L∗, is given by
L∗ = {y ∈ Rn : 〈x, y〉 ∈ Z for all x ∈ L} .
In fact, for this definition to make sense, we have to prove that L∗ is a lattice.
Proposition 2. If B is a basis of a lattice L ⊆ Rn, then L(B)∗ = L((B−1)T ). Moreover,
(L∗)∗ = L and det(L∗) = det(L)−1 for any lattice L.
Proof. Let z ∈ L((B−1)T ). Then there exists y ∈ Zn such that z = (B−1)T y. Let z′ ∈ L(B).
Then there exists x ∈ Zn such that z′ = Bx. Hence
〈z′, z〉 = (z′)T z = (Bx)T (B−1)T y = xTBT (BT )−1y = xT y ∈ Z.
Therefore z ∈ L(B)∗ and L((B−1)T ) ⊆ L(B)∗.
Let z ∈ L(B)∗. Then BT z ∈ Zn: writing z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn, B = [b1, . . . , bn] and bi =
(bi,1, . . . , bi,n) for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have
BT z =



































Hence z = (B−1)TBT z ∈ L((B−1)T ) and L(B)∗ ⊆ L((B−1)T ).
Let L = L(B) be any lattice. Then,
det(L∗) = det(L(B)∗) = det(L((B−1)T ) = |det((B−1)T )| = |det(B)|−1 = 1/ det(L).
Finally, (L∗)∗ = (L(B)∗)∗ = L((B−1)T ))∗ = L(((B−1)T )−1)T ) = L(B) = L.
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Example 1. Using the definition of dual lattice or using the previous proposition, we have
(tZn)∗ = 1tZ
n for every t ∈ R \ {0}.
If b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rn are m linearly independent vectors (over R), we can actually define the lattice
generated by b1, . . . , bm as above. If L is the lattice generated by b1, . . . , bm and B is a matrix
that represents the basis b1, . . . , bm, the determinant of L is defined as det(L) =
√
|det(BTB)|
and L∗ = {y ∈ spanR{b1, . . . , bm} : 〈x, y〉 ∈ Z for all x ∈ L}. These definitions generalize the
previous ones. In addition, L(B)∗ = L(B(BTB)−1). The previous results hold with the neces-
sary modifications and their proofs are similar.
A lattice L is said to be q-ary if qZn ⊆ L ⊆ Zn for some integer q. If q is an integer multiple
of det(L), then L is a q-ary lattice: letting L = L(B), q = k · det(L) for some k ∈ Z and
y ∈ qZn, we have y = qx for some x ∈ Zn and B−1y = B−1qx = ±k · adj(B)x ∈ Zn, and thus
y = B(±k · adj(B)x) ∈ L(B) = L. This proves that any integer lattice L ⊆ Zn is a q-ary lattice
for some integer q.
Given a matrix B ∈ Zn×mq where q,m, n ∈ Z, we define two m-dimensional q-ary lattices
Lq(B) = {y ∈ Zm : y = Bx (mod q) for some x ∈ Zn}
and
L⊥q (B) = {y ∈ Zm : By ≡ 0 (mod q)}.
The orthogonal symbol for this second lattice is because this lattice is formed by the orthogonal
vectors to the rows of B modulo q. This second lattice is called an Ajtai lattice. It can be shown
that L⊥q (B) = q · Lq(BT )∗ and Lq(B) = q · L⊥q (BT )∗. Given this result, we say that these two
lattices are dual to each other up to normalization.
Our main interest will be to find short vectors in random lattices, which is a well known com-
putational problem on lattices. There are more computational problems on lattices, of which
we have listed the most important ones below:
• The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP): Given a basis B of a lattice, find the shortest nonzero
vector in L(B);
• The Closest Vector Problem (CVP): Given a basis B of a lattice and a vector y, not
necessarily in the lattice, find the lattice point x ∈ L(B) closest to y. This is of course a
generalization of the SVP problem;
• The Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP): Given a basis B ∈ Zn×n of a lat-
tice, find n linearly independent vectors x1, . . . , xn ∈ L(B) minimizing the quantity
maxi=1,...,n ||xi||.
Since sometimes it is difficult to solve these problems (for instance, when the dimension of the
lattice is sufficiently large), one can consider the approximation variant of these problems, de-
noted with an additional subscript γ which indicates the approximation factor. For example,
in SVPγ the target is a vector whose norm is at most γ times the norm of the shortest nonzero
vector.
CHAPTER 3. LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 19
In order to find such short vectors in random lattices we use Minkowski’s Theorem applied with
the Lebesgue’s measure and V = Rn:
Theorem 3 (Minkowski). Let µ be a Haar measure, V an euclidean space, K a limited convex
symmetric by the origin of V and L a lattice in V . If µ(K) > 2nµ(V/L), then there exists
x ∈ L \ {0} such that x ∈ K. In other words, if µ(K) > 2nµ(V/L), then L ∩K 6= {0}.
Remark 1. The proof of Minkowski’s Theorem can be widely found in literature, such as in
[16]. If µ is a translation invariant measure, for all Z-basis {b1, . . . , bn} of L, the measure of the
parallelepiped P = {
∑n
i=1 xibi : 0 ≤ xi < 1} is independent of the chosen basis and this value is
called the covolume µ(V/L) of L. For V = Rn and the Lebesgue measure µ, the covolume of L
is det(L).
Suppose that K is closed. For all i = 1, . . . , n, let λi be the least real number such that L∩λiK
contains i linearly independent over Z elements. These λi are called the successive minima of
K on L. Minkowski’s Theorem is equivalent to the say that λn1µ(K) ≤ 2nµ(V/L). Generally,
we have for the successive minima:
Theorem 4 (Minkowski’s 2nd Theorem). In the same conditions of Minkowski’s Theorem above,
2n
n!
µ(V/L) ≤ λ1 · · ·λnµ(K) ≤ 2nµ(V/L).
Minkowski’s Theorem can be used to give some interesting and well known results in number
theory, such as: all prime numbers p ≡ 1 (mod 4) are a sum of two squares; all positive integers
are a sum of 4 squares.
Now suppose that K is the n-dimensional ball with radius 1, with the Lebesgue measure µ, in





Γ(1 + n2 )
.














That is, the square of the euclidean norm of the smallest nonzero element of L is majorated by
γn det(L)
2







The best possible value for γn (valid for all lattices in Rn) is called the nth Hermite constant.
Most of the values of γn are not currently known, i.e., finding the values of γn for all n ∈ N is





2 (known as Hermite’s majoration). The
following table summarizes the known values of γn:
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 24
γnn 1
4
3 2 4 8
64
3 64 256 4
24
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From the geometrical interpretation of the determinant of a lattice, we can heuristically estimate
λ1 as the smallest radius of a ball whose volume is det(L). Using the formula of the volume of





































where we used Stirling’s approximation and the behavior of (πn)
1
2n . From now on, for each




























Let us observe what we can find for an Ajtai lattice L⊥q (B), where B ∈ Zn×mq is a random matrix
such that m ≥ n and q is prime. Finding a short vector in L⊥q (B) is equivalent to find a short
solution for a set of n random equations modulo q in m variables. Since m ≥ n (and assuming
that n is not too close to m), with high probability the rows of B are linearly independent
over Zq. Thus the number of elements of Zmq which belong to L⊥q (B) is exactly qm−n. To see
this, remark that the linear map y 7→ By has kernel of dimension m − n. Therefore we have
det(L⊥q (B)) = q
n. Applying the Gaussian heuristic given above, we get
λ1(L
⊥







Next we introduce a technique for solving the Closest Vector Problem, called Babai’s Closest
Vertex Algorithm or Babai’s Rounding Technique, which is pretty intuitive.
Theorem 5 (Babai’s Closest Vertex Algorithm). Let L ⊆ Rn be a lattice with basis b1, . . . , bn.
If the basis vectors are sufficiently short and pairwise orthogonal, then the following algorithm
solves CVP:
Algorithm 1: Babai’s Closest Vertex Algorithm / Babai’s Rounding Technique
Input: A target vector v = t1b1 + · · ·+ tnbn ∈ Rn
Output: A vector b = a1b1 + · · ·+ anbn ∈ L
1 for i = 1 to n do
2 ai ← btie
3 end for
4 Output b = a1b1 + · · ·+ anbn
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Moreover, if the vectors of the basis are reasonably pairwise orthogonal, then the algorithm solves
CVPγ for some γ.
Remark 2. It is important to emphasize that Babai’s algorithm is not useful if the basis vectors
are highly non-orthogonal or if the basis vectors are not sufficiently short. In this case, Babai’s
algorithm generally returns a vector that is not in the lattice, normally far from the desired
lattice point. When we have a basis of a lattice formed by short and almost orthogonal vectors,
the Babai’s Closest Vertex Algorithm permits to solve certain instances of the CVP, namely
when the target vector is sufficiently close to the lattice.
3.2 Lattice reduction algorithms
In order to find better bases for lattices, i.e., bases consisting of short and nearly orthogonal
vectors, it is imperative to consider algorithms capable of doing such task. Such algorithms
are called lattice reduction algorithms, and they can be approximative or exact, as said in the
introduction of this chapter.
We start with the LLL algorithm which is the most known lattice reduction algorithm, which
dates back to 1982. Next we present the BKZ algorithm, which is an extension of the LLL
algorithm. BKZ algorithm is the best on finding short vectors in a lattice, thus we will focus
only on this algorithm and its improvements.
3.2.1 LLL algorithm
First we will recall some definitions and results of Linear Algebra. If V is a vector space and U
is a subspace of V , we have V = U ⊕ U⊥ and therefore every element v ∈ V can be written as
v = u+u′, where u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U⊥ are unique. We say that u is the orthogonal projection of v
over U and write u = prU (v). Therefore v = prU (v) + prU⊥(v). If {u1, . . . , up} is an orthogonal
basis of U , for all v ∈ V we have prU (v) =
〈v,u1〉
〈u1,u1〉u1 + · · ·+
〈v,up〉
〈up,up〉up.
Let us recall the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process:
Proposition 3. Let {b1, . . . , bn} be a basis of an euclidean space V . Define by recurrence the
vectors
• b∗1 = b1;




j , where µi,j =
〈bi,b∗j 〉
〈b∗j ,b∗j 〉
, for all i = 2, . . . , n.












































The second part of the proof can be found in any linear algebra book.
Remark 3. If {b1, . . . , bn} is a basis of a lattice, {b∗1, . . . , b∗n} is not in general a basis of L.
Lemma 1. Let L be a lattice and let b1, . . . , bn be a family of elements of L linearly independent




1 0 · · · 0 0
µ2,1 1 · · · 0 0
µ3,1 µ3,2






µn−1,1 µn−1,2 · · · 1 0
µn,1 µn,2 · · · µn,n−1 1

n×n
be the matrix of Gram-Schmidt coefficients. We haveB = B∗µT , and thus det(B) = det(B∗µT ) =
det(B∗) · 1 = det(B∗).
Lemma 2. Let {b1, . . . , bn} be a basis of an euclidean space V . For all i = 1, . . . , n, ||b∗i || ≤ ||bi||.














































= ||b∗i ||2 +
i−1∑
j=1
µ2i,j ||b∗j ||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
,
and now the result is clear.
The following corollary provides, like Minkowski’s 2nd Theorem, a lower bound of the product
of the successive minima:
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Corollary 1 (Hadamard). For all lattice L of V and all family B = {b1, . . . , bn} of elements of









i=1 ||bi|| if and only if B is a basis of L and an orthogonal basis of V .




















and the first part is proved.





and the second part is also proved.
If B is a basis of L and an orthogonal basis of V , we have b∗1 = b1, . . . , b
∗
n = bn and by the
previous part we have the desired equality.
Suppose now that det(L) =
∏n
i=1 ||bi||. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} be a basis of L. Since {b1, . . . , bn}
is linearly independent over Z, there exists M ∈ Zn×n such that
[b1 · · · bn] = [a1 · · · an]M
and det(M) 6= 0. Therefore det(B) 6= 0, which proves that {b1, . . . , bn} is linearly independent
over R. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we get
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We also have







Thus, det(M)2 = 1, so det(M) = ±1, which proves that {b1, . . . , bn} generates L. Hence








By the proof of Lemma 2, µi,j = 0 for all 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n, which implies that 〈bi, bj〉 = 0 for all
i 6= j. Hence {b1, . . . , bn} is an orthogonal basis of L.
The second part of the corollary proves that λ1 · · ·λn ≥ det(L) and suggests that the bases of L
formed by short vectors are almost orthogonal. In fact, if {b1, . . . , bn} is a basis of L formed by
short vectors,
∏n
i=1 ||bi|| is close to det(L) and, by the third part of the corollary {b1, . . . , bn} is
almost orthogonal.
This is what gives rise to the following definition. Let L be a lattice. We say that a basis
{b1, . . . , bn} of L is LLL-reduced if, with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization’s notation,
• |µi,j | ≤ 12 for all 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n;
• ||b∗i + µi,i−1b∗i−1||2 ≥ 34 ||b
∗
i−1||2 for all i = 2, . . . , n,







||b∗i−1||2 for all i = 2, . . . , n.
Remark 4. • Notice that the vectors b∗i + µi,i−1b∗i−1 and b∗i−1 are the orthogonal projections
of bi and b
∗
i−1 over the orthogonal of
⊕i−2
j=1 Rbj .
This can be seen by doing the same type of calculus done in Proposition 3.
• The constant 34 in second inequality may be replaced by any fixed real number
1
4 < δ < 1,
and all of the following results can be adapted.
When δ 6= 34 , we shall refer to a LLL-δ reduction.











i,i−1 ≤ 34 .
Then the second property says that b∗i is not much shorter than b
∗
i−1.
• In the second property, we say that ||b∗i + µi,i−1b∗i−1||2 ≥ 34 ||b
∗
i−1||2 for all i = 2, . . . , n is








































CHAPTER 3. LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 25
Theorem 6. Let {b1, . . . , bn} be a LLL-reduced basis of a lattice L of Rn. Then,





i=1 ||bi|| ≤ 2
n(n−1)
4 det(L);





4. For all x ∈ L \ {0}, ||b1|| ≤ 2
n−1
2 ||x||.
More generally, for all {x1, . . . , xt} of linearly independent elements of L over Z and all
j ≤ t, we have ||bj || ≤ 2
n−1
2 max{||x1||, . . . , ||xt||}.












||b∗1||2 ≤ 2||b∗2||2 ≤ 22||b∗3||2 ≤ · · · ≤ 2n−1||b∗n||2,
i.e.,
||b∗j ||2 ≤ 2i−j ||b∗i ||2.
Since




















||bj ||2 ≤ 2j−1||b∗j ||2 ≤ 2j−12i−j ||b∗i ||2 = 2i−1||b∗i ||2.
2. By Hadamard’s Corollary we have det(L) =
∏n
i=1 ||b∗i ||. Since ||b∗i || ≤ ||bi|| and, by the
first part, ||bi|| ≤ 2
i−1




























3. By the second part, we have
||b1||n = ||b1|| · · · ||b1|| ≤ 2
1−1
2 ||b∗1|| · · · 2
n−1
2 ||b∗n|| = 2
n(n−1)
4 det(L).






i , where ci ∈ Z and αi ∈ R. Since x 6= 0, there exists
a maximum k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ck 6= 0. By the definition of the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonal vectors, we have ck = αk. Since αk is integer,
||x||2 ≥ α2k||b∗k||2 ≥ ||b∗k||2.
By the first part, ||b1||2 ≤ 2i−1||b∗i ||2 ≤ 2n−1||b∗i ||2, hence
||b1||2 ≤ 2n−1||b∗k||2 ≤ 2n−1||x||2
and the first piece of the part is proved.
Write xj =
∑n
i=1 ci,jbi where ci,j ∈ Z. For a fixed j, denote by ij the largest i such
that ci,j 6= 0. By the first piece of this part, ||xj ||2 ≥ ||b∗ij ||
2. Renumber the xj so that
i1 ≤ · · · ≤ it. We now claim that j ≤ ij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. In order to get a contradiction,
we suppose that ij < j for a certain j. We have
x1 = c1,1b1 + · · ·+ cn,1bn
= c1,1b1 + · · ·+ ci1,1bi1 ∈ Zb1 + · · ·+ Zbi1
...
xj = c1,jb1 + · · ·+ cn,jbn
= c1,jb1 + · · ·+ cij ,jbij ∈ Zb1 + · · ·+ Zbij
Then x1, . . . , xj ∈ Zb1 + · · · + Zbij . Since ij < j, we obtain that x1, . . . , xj ∈ Zb1 + · · · +
Zbj−1, which is a contradiction, given that x1, . . . , xj are linearly independent over Z.
Since j ≤ ij , we have, by the first part,





Next we describe the LLL algorithm, given in Algorithm 2, which transforms a given basis
{b1, . . . , bn} of a lattice L into a LLL-reduced one.
If this algorithm ever terminates, we get a basis of L, since we only perform allowed column
elementary operations on lattices, which are swapping two columns and adding a column to
another one multiplied by an integer. Multiplying a column by an nonzero integer is not al-
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Algorithm 2: LLL reduction algorithm
Input: A basis {b1, . . . , bn} of a lattice L
Output: A LLL-reduced basis for L
1 Start: Compute b∗i and µi,j using Gram-Schmidt procedure
2 Reduction Step:
3 for i = 2 to n do
4 for j = i− 1 to 1, do




9 if ∃i such that 34 ||b
∗
i ||2 > ||µi+1,ib∗i + b∗i+1||2 then
10 bi ↔ bi+1
11 goto 1
12 end if
lowed, unless this integer is ±1.
Moreover, if the algorithm achieves completion, the second condition of a LLL-reduced basis is
fulfilled. We now have to prove that the first condition is also verified, namely after the reduction
step. As we only perform the allowed column elementary operations bi ← bi − dµi,jcbj where
i > j, the Gram-Schmidt vectors and coefficients do not change. This is what the following
lemma asserts.
Lemma 3. Let {b1, . . . , bn} be a basis of an euclidean space V and let {b′1, . . . , b′n} be another
basis of V such that b′i = bi +
∑
j<i ai,jbj, with ai,j ∈ Z. Then, the Gram-Schmidt vectors of
these two basis are the same, i.e., b∗i = b
′
i
∗ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. This is done by induction. While doing the calculations keep in mind that µi,i = 1 and
µi,j = 0 for j > i, as we have seen in the proof of Lemma 1.
Since the Gram-Schmidt vectors do not change, after making the column operation bi ← bi −
dµi,jcbj in the algorithm we have
|µi,j | =
∣∣∣∣∣〈bi − dµi,jcbj , b∗j 〉〈b∗j , b∗j 〉
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈bi, b∗j 〉〈b∗j , b∗j 〉 − d 〈bi, b
∗
j 〉
〈b∗j , b∗j 〉
c ·
〈bj , b∗j 〉
〈b∗j , b∗j 〉
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈bi, b∗j 〉〈b∗j , b∗j 〉 − d 〈bi, b
∗
j 〉




∣∣∣∣∣ 〈bi, b∗j 〉〈b∗j , b∗j 〉 − d 〈bi, b
∗
j 〉
〈b∗j , b∗j 〉
c
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 ,
and this proves that after the reduction step the first condition of a LLL-reduced basis is satisfied.
Putting all together, if the algorithm ever terminates, its output is a LLL-reduced basis. In [21]
and [29] we can find an analysis of the running time of the LLL algorithm. The strategy is to
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bound the number of iterations and the running time of a single iteration. If L is a lattice with
basis b1, . . . , bn and if B ∈ R≥2 is such that |bi|2 ≤ B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the LLL algorithm
has complexity O(n6(logB)3). If fast multiplication techniques are applied, it can be reduced
to O(n5+ε(logB)2+ε) for every ε > 0.
It is worth mentioning that, after LLL-reduction, the first vector of the new obtained basis is
relatively short. However, the first vector in the new basis obtained after LLL-reducing the basis
is not necessarily the shortest one among the vectors of the new basis. If we want to explicit
the shortest vector found by the LLL algorithm, we have to analyse the norm of the vectors of
the obtained basis and extract the shortest one. Making δ close to 1 will improve the quality of
the output basis, given the second property of the LLL-reduced bases.
Example 2. Consider the lattice L with basis
B =

16252 2404 41816 27419 62503
5541 46418 27475 53783 52719
48769 5335 56363 1412 22160
2593 59631 50417 42344 3940
22395 29390 62371 55983 64256
 .
The LLL-reduced basis (with δ = 0.999) is given by
1855 23160 29450 10069 4328
31849 −24484 −465 −8429 −17879
−6182 2259 8167 24671 30280
−5480 −11807 2997 −21117 29190
16007 10586 −19059 −18320 24708
 .
For this reduction we used the simple LLL algorithm implemented in NTL Library [39]. A
stronger version of LLL algorithm is also implemented in NTL Library, it is called LLL FP
(Floating Point) and the result for this basis is the same.
Name the vectors of the basis B by b1, . . . , bn and the vectors of the basis LLL(B) by b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n.
We can see that the norm of b′1 is greater than the norm of b
′
3.
However, neither of these vectors is the shortest one in the lattice. The shortest vector in L is
u = (−19381,−7964, 16504,−24114, 739)
= 2b1 − b2 − b3 + 2b4 − b5
= −b′3 + b′4,
computed with an exact algorithm that we will present in the next section, or with the BKZ
algorithm (with parameter β ≥ 3).
To finish, we give some applications of the LLL algorithm:
1. Factoring polynomials over Z or Q. In fact, LLL algorithm came up with this purpose;
2. Finding the minimal polynomial of an algebraic number α, given a good enough approxi-
mation of α;
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3. Integer Linear Programming. Using LLL algorithm, we can obtain a solution in polynomial
time.
4. Other lattice problems aside from SVP, such as CVP approximate;
5. Cryptanalysis, for example, in special cases of RSA and lattice-based cryptosystems;
6. Finding integer relations: given x1, . . . , xn ∈ R \ {0}, LLL algorithm can often determine
if they are linearly dependent over Z and then find a relation a1x1 + · · · + anxn with
a1, . . . , an ∈ Z. For this, we consider for all integer M > 0 the positive definite quadratic
form QM (a1, . . . , an) = a
2
2 + · · · + a2n + M(a1x1 + · · · + anxn)2. If M is big enough, the
elements a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Zn such that QM (a) is small enough are candidates to provide
such relations. As an example, we have the Machin’s formula arctan(1)− 4 arctan(1/5) +
arctan(1/239) = 0.
7. Obtain a basis from a given set of linearly dependent lattice vectors, using the previous
topic. This will be specially useful for BKZ reduction algorithm presented below.
3.2.2 BKZ algorithm
The Blockwise-Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm dates back from 1987 and was introduced
by Schnorr and Euchner. Despite of being the best reduction algorithm known in practice, BKZ
uses an exact reduction algorithm as a subroutine (more specifically an enumeration subrou-
tine) which is usually super-exponential in time. This enumeration subroutine can be quickened
with some pruning techniques [11]. The time complexity of the BKZ algorithm is essentially
unknown, and for that reason it became necessary some algorithm permitting to predict the
quality of the output basis and to estimate the necessary time for BKZ-reducing the basis,
without the need to run BKZ itself. In 2011, Yuanmi Chen and Phong Nguyen published the
called BKZ simulation algorithm, together with an improvement of the BKZ algorithm, BKZ 2.0.
To properly explain the BKZ algorithm, we introduce some new definitions. First we define the
orthogonal projections
pri : Rn → 〈b1, . . . , bi−1〉⊥
















for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Next, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n, we define the local (projected) lattice L[j,k] as
L[j,k] = spanZ{prj(bj), . . . ,prj(bk)}
and the local block B[j,k] as
B[j,k] = {prj(bj), . . . ,prj(bk)}.
From these definitions, it is clear that B[j,k] is a basis of L[j,k] and L[j,k] = L(B[j,k]).
For our purposes, the considered local blocks are B[i,min{i+β−1,n}], where β is an additional
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parameter called blocksize. Explicitly the considered local blocks are
B[1,β], B[2,β+1], . . . , B[t,β+t−1], B[t+1,n], . . . , B[n,n]
where B[t,β+t−1] is the last block of size β (meaning that β + t − 1 = n). The following blocks
decrease successively in size by one unit. The BKZ algorithm aims to ensure that the first vector
in each of these blocks is the shortest vector in the corresponding local projected lattice, i.e., in
the lattice generated by the corresponding local block.
Because of that, the BKZ algorithm needs an exact algorithm for finding shortest vectors. As
β increases, the output basis is more reduced, but the running time of the algorithm increases,
since the local projected lattices get bigger in dimension. Since the running time of BKZ algo-
rithm is influenced by the blocksize β and the dimension n of the lattice, some values for (n, β)
may lead the algorithm to take too much time in the reduction. However, one can abort the
algorithm after some hours or days hoping to get a good enough basis for the intended purpose.
As said in [5], Hanrot et al. proved that the bases obtained by aborting BKZ are only slightly
worse than the ones obtained after the completion of BKZ. One can use the implementation of
BKZ algorithm in NTL Library to study the running time of BKZ according to both n and β.
The algorithm has the following inputs: the basis of a lattice, a blocksize β ∈ {2, . . . , n} and
a factor δ used in the LLL algorithm. The main idea of BKZ algorithm is to make the output
basis have the shortest Gram-Schmidt vectors possible. For that, the algorithm ensures that
all local blocks B[j,min(j+β−1,n)] have as first vector the shortest one in the corresponding local
projected lattice. If this happens, the new b∗j is the smallest vector in the local projected lattice
L[j,min(j+β−1,n)], since b
∗
j = prj(bj). The BKZ algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: BKZ reduction algorithm
Input: A basis {b1, . . . , bn} of a lattice L, a blocksize β ∈ {2, . . . , n} and a factor δ for
LLL
Output: A BKZ-β reduced basis of L
1 LLL(b1, . . . , bn,µ)
2 z ← 0
3 j ← 0
4 while z < n− 1 do
5 j ← (j (mod n− 1)) + 1; k ← min{j + β + 1, n} //define the local block
6 h← min{k + 1, n}
7 v ←Enum(L[j,k]) //find v = (vj , . . . , vk) ∈ Zk−j+1 \ {0} such that
||prj(
∑k
i=j vibi)|| = λ1(L[j,k])
8 if v 6= (1, 0, . . . , 0) then
9 z ← 0
10 LLL(b1, . . . , bj−1,
∑k
i=j vibi, bj , . . . , bh,µ)
11 else
12 z ← z + 1
13 LLL(b1, . . . , bh,µ)
14 end if
15 end while
16 Output b1, . . . , bn
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As we can see in Algorithm 3, we begin with preprocessing the given basis using the LLL al-
gorithm. Before moving to the next block, we also LLL-reduce the basis {b1, . . . , bh}, where
h = min{k + 1, n}, for preprocessing the next block.
If the first vector of a block B[j,k] is the shortest one in the local projected lattice L[j,k], we
LLL-reduce the basis {b1, . . . , bh} and we proceed to the next block B[j+1,min{k+1,n}]. If not,
the Enum subroutine permits to find a linear combination of bnew = vjbj + · · ·+ vkbk such that
prj(bnew) is the shortest vector in L[j,k]. After that, we insert bnew in the current basis, between
bj−1 and bj , and LLL-reduce the resultant basis b1, . . . , bj−1, bnew, bj , . . . , bh for solving the linear
dependency. This application of LLL may spoil things for some previous local blocks. Because
of that, we define j as it is described in the algorithm, to guarantee that after processing the
last block we come back to the first block, and we also add a variable z in the algorithm with
the function of controlling the termination of the algorithm. When z = n, which means that
all local blocks have as first vector the shortest one in the local projected lattice, the algorithm
terminates.
We remark that the notation LLL(b1, . . . , bn;µ) refers to a LLL-reducing of the basis {b1, . . . , bn}
and an updating of the Gram-Schmidt coefficients. We can also improve the efficiency if the
algorithm by permitting LLL algorithm to begin at a certain stage, since we know that the
basis {b1, . . . , bj−1} or {b1, . . . , bh−1}, depending on the if clause of the algorithm, is already
LLL-reduced. When we do this we have to make sure that if an insertion has occurred then we
place the new vector bnew in the right place. It is also clear that the BKZ algorithm is stronger
than LLL algorithm, the output basis of BKZ algorithm is at least LLL-reduced.
Enumeration Subroutine
To ease notation, avoiding local projected lattices and local blocks, we describe the algorithm of
this subroutine for a general lattice. One can easily adapt the algorithm for the BKZ algorithm.
The idea is to describe a basic enumeration algorithm that can output the shortest vector of an
arbitrary lattice. More details and optimizations of this subroutine (applied to BKZ algorithm)
can be found in [5] and [11].
Let us now explore the enumeration subroutine of the BKZ reduction algorithm. This is an
exact algorithm to find the shortest vector in a lattice, and so as the dimension of the lattice
increases, the running time of the algorithm grows exponentially. As the name suggests, the
idea consists on enumerating all possible vectors in the lattice whose length is bounded by some
constant that we will disclose below.
So let L ⊆ Rn be a lattice and let B = [b1, . . . , bm] be a matrix that represents a basis for this
lattice. We begin by defining the search space of the enumeration as the set of all coefficient







where C = ||b∗1||2 = ||b1||2. This choice for such a constant seems very naive, but there is a
reason for it. When the basis of the lattice is LLL-reduced, b1 is probably the shortest known
vector of the lattice. Recall that the enumeration subroutine is called after the basis has been
LLL-reduced. While the algorithm search in the tree the shortest vector of the lattice, this bound
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C is updated for efficiency reasons, permitting cutting some branches of the tree. This constant
C can initially be lesser than ||b1||2 if we know more or less the length of the shortest vector of
the lattice. Feeding the algorithm a better value for C will reduce the search space of the al-
gorithm, but of course if we attribute to C a too low value, the algorithm returns nothing useful.








































































































































lm = (um + cm)
2||b∗m||2
lm−1 = lm + (um−1 + cm−1)
2||b∗m−1||2
...
l1 = l2 + (u1 + c1)
2||b∗1||2.
In general and by recursion, lk = lk+1 + (uk + ck)
2||b∗k||2 for all k = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and lm =
(um + cm)




Now we can write the enumeration algorithm, Algorithm 4, which is given in [7]. In the algo-
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rithm, t represents the level where we are in the tree. The following figure exemplifies the aspect
of such trees. The leafs are located in level 1 and the root of the enumeration tree is a virtual
vertex. If this vertex did not exist, instead of a tree we would have a forest.
Algorithm 4: A basic enumeration algorithm
Input: Gram-Schmidt coefficients µi,j and the squared norms of the Gram-Schmidt
vectors ||b∗1||2, . . . , ||b∗m||2 of a lattice with basis {b1, . . . , bm}
Output: A vector of coefficients u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Zm such that
∑m
t=1 utbt is the
shortest vector in the lattice
1 C ← ||b∗1||2
2 u← (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zm
3 umin ← (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zm
4 l← (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zm+1
5 c← (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zm
6 t = 1
7 while t < m− 1 do
8 lt ← lt+1 + (ut + ct)2||b∗t ||2
9 if lt < C then
10 if t = 1 then
11 umin ← u
12 C ← lt
13 else




16 ut ← −bcte
17 end if
18 else
19 t← t+ 1




The starting point for this exhaustive search is the vector u = (1, 0, . . . , 0), since we defined the
initial bound as C = ||b∗1|| = ||b1||. In the algorithm, umin is the vector of coefficients which
defines the shortest vector found. We initialize it as umin = u = (1, 0, . . . , 0). The vector l has
coordinates lk defined as before, so we must initialize it as l = (||b1||2, 0, . . . , 0). Since the algo-
rithm computes l1 at line 8, we actually can initialize l as l = (0, . . . , 0). This vector has to have
an extra coordinate lm+1 = 0 because of the computation of line 8. Since we have initialized u
as u = (1, 0, . . . , 0), we must initialize c, whose coordinates were defined before, as c = (0, . . . , 0).




2 is lesser than the actual bound C, leading to two cases:
1. If t = 1, i.e., if we land on a new leaf, the bound C and umin are both updated;
2. If t 6= 1, we move one level down in the tree, compute the coefficient ct and set ut = −bcte,
as this value is the best one for minimizing the (squared) norm lt = lt+1 + (ut + ct)
2||b∗t ||2.
In [7] there is a mistake in this part of the algorithm which we corrected.
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If lt ≥ C, we move one level up in the tree and choose the next ut using the zig-zag pattern
−bcte+ 1,−bcte − 1,−bcte+ 2,−bcte − 2, . . .
Fig. 3.1: Example of an enumeration tree.
This is the enumeration tree corresponding to the LLL-reduced
basis of Example 2 in the section of LLL algorithm.
BKZ 2.0 algorithm
The BKZ 2.0 algorithm is an updated version of the original BKZ algorithm, given by Chen and
Nguyen in [5]. This version includes four improvements, and one of them is simply an early-abort
(which is common in cryptanalysis), that is, add a parameter that specifies how many iterations
should be performed. We next give an idea of the other three improvements.
1. Due to the cost of the enumeration subroutine, it is useful to consider some pruning
techniques to shorten the enumeration tree. BKZ 2.0 uses such pruning techniques, given
in [11] by Gama, Nguyen and Regev, that provide asymptotical speedups in the running
time of BKZ.
2. Before processing a local block, the corresponding basis is LLL-reduced. However, LLL-
reducing the basis can worsen its quality. Therefore, Chen and Nguyen implemented in
BKZ an additional function, which aims to ensure that bases are more than LLL-reduced
before processing local blocks, without big time consumption.
3. The enumeration subroutine of BKZ algorithm uses the initial bound C = ||b∗j ||2 when
searching λ1(L[j,k]), and thus for decreasing the running time of it we may consider a
lower initial bound. For this, we use the Gaussian Heuristic of L[j,k]. However, when the
dimension of the local projected lattices used in BKZ algorithm is low, say ≤ 30, those
local projected lattices do not behave like random lattices and therefore the Gaussian
Heuristic cannot be used. Hence, for all local project lattices except the last 30 ones, we
choose as initial bound C = min{||b∗j ||2, γ2GH(L[j,k])}, where γ is typically 1.05.
The BKZ 2.0 algorithm was used for breaking some lattice records and for solving some SVP
and Darmstadt’s lattice challenges. The goal of SVP challenges [31] is to find a nonzero lattice
vector of norm ≤ 1.05GH(L), where L is a random integer lattice of large volume, whilst in
Darmstadt’s lattice challenges [22] the goal is to find a vector of norm < q in an Ajtai lattice,
where the modulus q depends on the dimension of the lattice (for example, in the toy challenge
of dimension 200 found in [22], q = 30).
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BKZ simulation algorithm
Considering the BKZ algorithm, we define a round in BKZ as a complete iteration of j from 1
to n − 1. Given a lattice L with basis {b1, . . . , bn}, the BKZ simulation algorithm predicts the
norms ||b∗1||, . . . , ||b∗n|| after N rounds in BKZ. We will denote by ||b∗1′||, . . . , ||b∗n′|| the norms of
the Gram-Schmidt vectors of the basis {b1, . . . , bn} after N rounds in BKZ.
For efficiency reasons, the BKZ simulation algorithm works with the logarithms of these norms.
Hence, and to ease writing, we define for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
li = log(||b∗i ||) and l′i = log(||b∗i
′||).
The BKZ simulation algorithm has as inputs the norms li, the blocksize β used in BKZ and the
number of rounds N in BKZ to simulate. It can be used for determining the necessary number
of rounds in BKZ until a good basis is found.
In the algorithm, j denotes the current round and local blocks are denoted by B[k,f ]. Comparing
with the BKZ algorithm, we changed the role of j and k, but we preferred to keep the notation
of [5], although it is easy to change the simulation algorithm to match notation.
It is said that a basis of a lattice L is HKZ-reduced (Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev reduction) if
• |µi,j | ≤ 12 for all 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m;
• ||b∗i || = λ1(Li) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
where Li = pri(L). Since L1 = L (recall that pr1 is the identity map), b1 is the shortest vector
of L.
Proposition 4. We have:
1. Li = pri(L) = L[i,n];
2. After a round in BKZ, the last blocks B[t,n], . . . , B[n,n] (where t = n − β + 1) are HKZ-
reduced;
3. HKZ reduction is stronger than BKZ reduction.
Each of these statements can be easily checked. We now have the following chain: BKZ re-
duction is stronger than LLL reduction (as we could see before) and HKZ reduction is stronger
than BKZ reduction. We also remark that not all local blocks are HKZ-reduced after a round
in BKZ, just the last ones.
In random lattices, the length of the shortest vector can be approximated using the Gaussian
heuristic GH. The BKZ simulation algorithm uses this fact to predict the length of the shor-
tes vector of local projected lattices used in the BKZ algorithm, assuming that those lattices
behave like random lattices. As it was experienced by Gama and Nguyen in [5], non-extreme
local blocks L[j,j+β−1] have a ratio λ1/GH that converge to the ratio of a random lattice of
dimension β as β increases. The intuitive reason for the approximation of these two ratios is
that when the dimension increases, there are more and more random lattices in the set of all
lattices. When β ≥ 45, the approximation gets more and more evident. Therefore, the BKZ
simulation algorithm requires a blocksize β ≥ 45.
Therefore, we predict λ1(L[j,k]) as:
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1. For non-extreme local blocks, i.e., for the local blocks B[1,β], . . . , B[n−β,n−1], we use the
Gaussian Heuristic GH(L[j,k]), unless ||prj(bj)|| = ||b∗j || is already better.
2. For the extreme local blocks B[n−β+1,n], . . . , B[n,n], since they are HKZ-reduced, we sup-
pose that they behave like HKZ-reduced bases from random lattices of the same volume.
Because of that, the ideal would be to compute, according with the chosen blocksize β, the
average norm of the corresponding HKZ-reduced lattice. However, when β is too large,
computing these averages may take too much time. Then,
• We precompute these average norms for the last 45 local blocks
B[n−44,n], . . . , B[n,n].
They are computed experimentally, where an example is given in [12].
• We use the Gaussian Heuristic for the other β − 45 local blocks
B[n−β+1,n], . . . , B[n−45,n].
Now we can write the BKZ simulation algorithm, which is given in Algorithm 5.
As said before, k and f define the local block, and the variable d denotes the dimension of the
local projected lattice. The variable cd stores the logarithm of the volume of a d-dimensional
ball of radius 1, used in the calculation of the Gaussian Heuristic. The variable φ is a boolean
variable which stores false if ||b∗k|| is compared with GH(L[k,f ]) and GH(L[k,f ]) is better. This
corresponds to the insertion of a new vector in the current basis in BKZ algorithm. After the
insertion of a new vector in the current basis and the LLL-reducing in BKZ algorithm, i.e., after
the change of the variable φ to false, the following Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗k+1, ..., b
∗
n−45 may
not be in the local projected lattice anymore. Because of this, we use the Gaussian Heuristic







det(L[k,f ]) 1d · Γ (d2 + 1) 1d√π
 = log (det(L[k,f ]))
d
+ cd.
The following Lemma will allow us to compute the volume of each local projected lattice L[k,f ],
i.e., det(L[k,f ]), stored in the variable V in the algorithm.
Lemma 4. We have det(L[1,k]) = det(L[1,j−1]) · det(L[j,k]).
Proof. We know that pr1 is the identity map, so pr1(b1) = b1, . . . ,pr1(bk) = bk. Then, {pr1(b1), . . . ,pr1(bk)} =










To finish, we calculate det(L[j,k]). In order to apply Hadamard’s Theorem, we need to compute
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Algorithm 5: BKZ Simulation Algorithm
Input: The logarithms of the Gram-Schmidt norms li = log(||b∗i ||), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
desired blocksize β ∈ {45, . . . , n} and the number of rounds N to simulate
Output: A prediction for the logarithms of the Gram-Schmidt norms l′i = log(||b∗i
′||)
after N rounds of BKZ reduction
1 for k = 1 to 45 do
2 rk ← average log(||b∗k||) of a HKZ-reduced random unit volume 45-dimensional
lattice
3 end for
4 for d = 46 to β do










7 for i = 1 to n do
8 l′i = li
9 end for
10 for j = 1 to N do
11 φ← true
12 for k = 1 to n− 45 do
13 d← min{β, n− k + 1}








16 if φ = true then
























29 for i = 1 to n do
30 li ← l′i
31 end for
32 end for
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the Gram-Schmidt vectors prj(bj)
∗, . . . ,prj(bk)







〈b∗t , b∗t 〉
b∗t
for all 0 ≤ p ≤ k − j, we get, by Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, prj(bj)∗ = b∗j , prj(bj+1)∗ =
b∗j+1, . . . , prj(bk)






















since a change in the basis {b1, . . . , bf} does not change the volume of L[1,f ]. Taking logarithms,







The algorithm that we give is slightly different from the original given in [5]. We followed a
suggestion of correction for this algorithm, given in [12], where:
1. In the original version, f is set to be min{k + β, n} and the intention was that the size of
the set {k, . . . , f} was equal to β, so there is an element too much. The correction is to
set f = min{k + β − 1, n};
2. The original version of the algorithm implicitly assumes that the l′i’s are initialized with
the values stored in the li’s at the beginning of the algorithm. This assumption is added
explicitly in the recent version.
We remark as well that this algorithm may not work with bases of special structure, such as
the bases of NTRU lattices, presented in the next chapter. A Java implementation of the BKZ
simulation algorithm can be found in [12].
3.3 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Like all already known classical public-key cryptosystems based on the hardness of certain num-
ber theory problems, such as RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), McEliece and many
others, we can build many public-key encryption schemes using the presumed hardness of lat-
tice problems. We will see three well-known proposals, the GGH/HNF, NTRU and LWE-based
schemes, based on the hardness of the CVP, the SVP and LWE problem respectively.
Like lattice reduction algorithms, there is a duality between theory and practice in such en-
cryption schemes. Some cryptosystems cannot be put in practice due to their inefficiency, yet
interesting since they admit strong security proofs. This means that breaking such cryptosys-
tems on the average case (i.e., when keys are chosen randomly) is at least as hard as solving the
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underlying lattice problem in the worst case (i.e., solving the underlying lattice problem in any
case). On the other hand, other cryptosystems notable by their efficiency in most cases do not
enjoy of such security proofs.
We begin by describing the GGH cryptosystem with its HNF variant. This a very simple and
interesting example of a lattice-based scheme, but proved to be unsafe.
After this, we introduce the NTRU scheme, which will be of our main interest. This is the
most efficient cryptosystem known to date, but lacks a security proof. Besides being quantum-
resistant, the NTRU cryptosystem is an alternative to the classical cryptosystems used nowa-
days, such as RSA. In this chapter we will introduce this public-key cryptosystem and in chapter
4 we will analyse its security, focusing obviously on lattice reduction attacks.
Finally we describe the LWE-based cryptosystem, proposed by Regev and based on the Le-
arning With Errors problem. This is the most efficient cryptographic construction known to
date relying on a security proof. The LWE-based cryptosystem is not as efficient as the NTRU
cryptosystem, but it can be used in practice.
There are other cryptographic schemes with security proofs, such as the Ajtai-Dwork cryp-
tosystem, which was the first one enjoying a security proof. However, this cryptosystem is not
efficient: the public key size is Õ(n4) and the encryption blowup factor is Õ(n2). When the
dimension of the underlying lattice is sufficiently high, the public key size can reach several
gigabytes, making the cryptosystem useless in practice.
3.3.1 The GGH/HNF Public-Key Cryptosystem
In 1997, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi published the GGH cryptosystem, which is the lat-
tice analogue of the McEliece cryptosystem. Its idea is described in Scheme 1. The GGH
Scheme 1: The GGH/HNF Public-Key Cryptosystem
Parameters : A dimension n, a lattice L ⊆ Zn of dimension n and M ∈ N
Private Key: A good basis B of L formed by short and almost orthogonal vectors
Public Key : A bad basis H for L, such as the Hermite Normal Form (HNF) of B. If
the HNF of B is taken, we refer this cryptosystem by GGH/HNF.
Encryption : The message space is the set
{m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Zn : −M ≤ m1, . . . ,mn ≤M}. Given an element m
of the message space, the ciphertext is c = Hm+ e, where e is a short
noise vector.
Decryption : To decrypt the ciphertext c, one computes
B−1c = B−1(Hm+ e) = B−1(BUm+ e) = Um+B−1e. The Babai
rounding technique will be used to remove the term B−1e as long as it is
small enough. Finally one computes m = U−1Um.
cryptosystem, likewise NTRU and LWE-Based cryptosystems, is a probabilistic cryptosystem
since a single message can be encrypted in many different ways depending on the chosen noise
vector.
For a full-rank matrix B ∈ Zn×n, we define the Hermite Normal Form of B to be the matrix
H ∈ Zn×n satisfying the following conditions:
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1. Hi,j = 0 for all j > i (i.e., H is a lower triangular matrix);
2. Hi,i ≥ 0 for all i (i.e., the pivot of each column of H is positive);
3. Hi,j ≥ 0 and Hi,j ≤ Hi,i for all j < i.
The HNF of a matrix always exists and is unique. There are alternative definitions of the HNF
of a matrix, such as defining it with upper triangular matrices, although the result is equal up
to transposition. The HNF of a matrix can be efficiently computed using the NTL Library. As
we can see in the description of the algorithm, it is useful to store the unimodular matrix U
such that H = BU .
Essentially, the Hermite Normal Form is good to be used as a public basis. This is because if
one can attack the HNF H of the private basis B, then all bases B′ of the lattice can be attacked
by computing theirs HNF H ′ which is H. In addition, the HNF of a good basis normally is not
a good basis.
At Crypto ’99 conference, Nguyen showed that the GGH cryptosystem is not secure, since
every ciphertext can be used to uncover some information about the original message, and since
decryption is easier than presupposed [24]. Still, GGH remains secure for sufficiently large values
of n, though such values make GGH impractical.
3.3.2 The NTRU Public-Key Cryptosystem
The NTRU cryptosystem was firstly proposed in 1996 by Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher and Jo-
seph Silverman and later in 1998 published. The name NTRU is short for N th degree truncated
polynomial ring, but this acronym can also stand for Number Theorists aRe Us and Number
Theory Research Unit.
Several descriptions of the NTRU cryptosystem can be found in the literature. Some describe it
more generally, as it was introduced in [13] and [15], and others describe it in a particular and
suitable case choice of parameters. In this description we will begin by presenting the general
case and then step by step descending to those particular cases.
Notation and Parameters
Let N, p, q be positive integers. In order to fix notation and ease writing, we define
RN = Z[X]/〈XN − 1〉
and similarly
RN,p = Z[X]/〈p,XN − 1〉 and RN,q = Z[X]/〈q,XN − 1〉.
From now on, the multiplication in RN will be denoted by the symbol ~. We also define, for
later purposes, the polynomial set
Pp(c) =
{
polynomials of degree at most c− 1
with (mod p) coefficients
}
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and the notation
[g]p =
g with its coefficients reduced
modulo p into the range ]−p/2, p/2]
for all polynomial g ∈ Z[X].
Besides being polynomials, the elements of RN can be expressed as vectors of coefficients, i.e.,





i = (f0, f1, . . . , fN−1).
Since ~ is essentially a convolution product, it is easy to see that, if f, g ∈ RN , then

















We define a generating function
G : Pp(c)→ Pp(c)
and a hash function
H : Pp(c)× Pp(c)→ Pp(c′),
required for building a digital envelope. In order to guarantee security, given an output value
of these functions, we must ensure that the inputs are difficult to find. Moreover, to guarantee
efficiency, G and H must be easy to compute.
The original version of NTRU given in [15] does not include the use of a digital envelope, i.e.,
both functions G and H would be identically zero. This obviously reduces the security of the
cryptosystem. We may refer to this improved version of the original NTRU as NTRU PKC
digital envelope.
Following the previous notation, the main parameters of the NTRU cryptosystem are N, p, q,
where gcd(p, q) = 1 and q  p, and an additional integer parameter 0 ≤ k < N . Note that p and
q need not be prime. In section 4.1.1 we will explain why we need the assumption gcd(p, q) = 1.
In addition to these four integer parameters (N, p, q, k), the NTRU cryptosystem depends on
four sets Lf ,Lg,Lφ ⊆ RN and Lm ⊆ Pp(N − k).
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Key Creation
To create both public and private keys, we choose two polynomials f ∈ Lf and g ∈ Lg. To avoid
some confusion induced by the notation, we must read “Lf is the set where we pick polynomials
playing the role of f”. This is valid for the other three sets defined before. In addition, we must
require that f has both inverses modulo p and modulo q. So if this is not the case, we must
repeat the choice of f until both inverses exist.
When studying the efficiency of the cryptosystem, we must then ensure that the choice of such
a polynomial f is quick, i.e., that finding such a polynomial with both inverses modulo p and
q in Lf happens at the first attempt. The computation of these inverses can be done using the
Euclidean algorithm, or using the Almost Inverse Algorithm of Schroeppel, Orman, O’Malley
and Spatscheck [43]. We will study the invertibility in truncated polynomial rings in section
4.1.2.
These inverses are denoted by f−1p and f
−1
q , meaning that,
f−1p ~ f ≡ 1 (mod p) and f−1q ~ f ≡ 1 (mod q).
Next, we compute
h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q)
which will be the public key. In [15], h is defined as h ≡ f−1q ~ g (mod q), but for efficiency
reasons, due to ciphertext form, we decided to define h this way.
The private key is the polynomial f together with f−1p , since storing f
−1
p will be particularly
useful for decryption. As we will see, after computing the public key h, one can discard the
chosen polynomial g.
Encryption
Suppose that Bob has selected (N, p, q, k) as parameters and has settled h as his public key. If
Alice wants to send a message m ∈ Lm ⊆ Pp(N − k) to Bob, she chooses a polynomial φ ∈ Lφ
randomly and computes the ciphertext
e ≡ φ~ h+ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)XN−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p (mod q),
which will be sent to Bob. When not using a digital envelope, the encrypted message is simply
e ≡ φ~ h+m (mod q).
As with the public key h, in [15] the ciphertext is defined as e ≡ pφ~ h+m (mod q).
Decryption
When Bob receives a ciphertext e from anyone, say Alice, he first computes
a = [f ~ e]q,
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which is, by the previous notation, f ~ e reduced modulo q with coefficients in the interval
]− q/2, q/2]. Then he computes
t = f−1p ~ a (mod p)
and
b ≡ e− t (mod p) and c ≡ t−G(b) (mod p),
and after that he writes c in the form
c = c′ + c′′XN−k with deg(c′) < N − k and deg(c′′) < k.
Lastly he compares c′′ and H(c′, b): if these two values are equal, Bob has correctly decrypted
the ciphertext and the original message is c′; if not, a decryption error has occurred.
Now we will explain why is this procedure able to decrypt a ciphertext. Developing the poly-
nomial f ~ e (mod q), we get
f ~ e ≡ f ~ φ~ h+ f ~ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)XN−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p (mod q)
≡ f ~ φ~ pf−1q ~ g + f ~ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)XN−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p (mod q)









Choosing a suitable set of parameters, the polynomial
pφ~ g + f ~ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)X
N−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p
has coefficients in ]−q/2, q/2] for most ciphertexts e, and thus when Bob computes a he retrieves
exactly
pφ~ g + f ~ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)X
N−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p
in RN . Reducing this polynomial modulo p he gets
f ~ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)X
N−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p
in RN , and multiplying the result by f
−1
p , he gets
m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)X
N−k +G([φ~ h]p)
in RN,p, which is the polynomial t. Hence
b ≡ e− t (mod p)
≡ φ~ h (mod p)
44 3.3. PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
and
c ≡ t−G(b) (mod p)
≡ m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)Xn−k (mod p).
Therefore
c′ ≡ m (mod p) and c′′ ≡ H(m, [φ~ h]p) (mod p).
Remark 5. 1. This decryption procedure has a chance to fail, usually when the message m
is not centered, i.e., when the coefficients of m are far from the interval ] − q/2, q/2]. If
this is the case, Bob can try to choose a different interval ]− q/2± x, q/2± x] where the
coefficients of a lie, a translation of the interval ]− q/2, q/2] with x small. If this attempt
results in recovering the message, we say that a wrap failure occurred. If no value of x
works, we say that a gap failure occurred. Therefore it is important to guarantee that the
message space Lm contains only centered polynomials. However, more study about the
parameters of NTRU is required in order to avoid decryption errors. We will see in section
4.1.3 what parameters ensure that decryption errors are very rare or nonexistent.
2. In [41] we can find an efficient mod q to mod p conversion algorithm, assisting the efficiency
of the cryptosystem.
Parameter Selection
For efficiency reasons, we are interested in fast modulo q operations, so we set q being a power
of 2. Since gcd(p, q) = 1, we must then have p odd. In view of the previous remark, we set
Lm =
{
m ∈ RN :
m has coefficients between− 12(p− 1) and
1
2(p− 1)
and has degree at most N − k − 1
}
.
Again motivated by efficiency reasons, the polynomials in Lf ,Lg and Lφ are wanted with small
coefficients, so we set
Lf = L(df + 1, df ), Lg = L(dg, dg), and Lφ = L(dφ, dφ),
where df , dg, dφ are positive integers and
L(d1, d2) =
{
F ∈ RN :
F has d1 coefficients equal to 1, d2 coefficients
equal to − 1, and the remaining coefficients all equal to 0
}
.
We set Lf = L(df + 1, df ) instead of Lf = L(df , df ), since the polynomial f must be invertible
modulo p and q. If f ∈ L(df , df ), then f(1) = 0, and then f cannot be invertible, as the next
proposition says.
Proposition 5. If f ∈ RN is invertible, then f(1) 6= 0. If f ∈ RN,q is invertible, then f(1) is
invertible in Zq, i.e., f(1) ∈ Z∗q.
Proof. For the first part, write f = f0 + f1X + · · ·+ fN−1XN−1 and its inverse f ′ = f ′0 + f ′1X +
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f(1)f ′(1) = 1,
and therefore f(1) 6= 0.
For the second part the above calculations are valid modulo q, permitting to conclude that
f(1)f ′(1) ≡ 1 (mod q).
In the following table, we present the suggested parameters given in the two original NTRU
papers [13] and [15]. If not using a digital envelope, one can ignore the value of k. These
parameter choices lead to a residual probability of getting a decryption error, as we can see by
experimentation.
Security N p q k df dg dφ
Low 107 3 64 - 14 12 5
Moderate 167 3 128 49 60 20 18
High 263 3 128 52 49 24 16
Highest 503 3 256 107 215 72 55
Table 3.1: Security levels were adjusted to current attacks;
In the first parameter set, given in [15], k is not defined,
as the use of a digital envelope was not introduced yet.
Synthesis
Here is a compact of the previous sections:
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Scheme 2: The NTRU Public-Key Cryptosystem
Parameters : N, p, q, df , dg, dφ
Private Key: f ∈ L(df + 1, df ) invertible in RN,p and RN,q, g ∈ L(dg, dg)
Public Key : h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q)
Encryption : e = φ~ h+m (mod q), where φ ∈ L(dφ, dφ)
Decryption : Compute a ≡ f ~ e (mod q) where the coefficients of a are in the interval
]− q/2, q/2].
Take a (mod p) and compute f−1p ~ a (mod p) to retrieve the
message m.
Scheme 3: The NTRU digital envelope Public-Key Cryptosystem
Parameters : N, p, q, k, df , dg, dφ
Private Key: f ∈ L(df + 1, df ) invertible in RN,p and RN,q, g ∈ L(dg, dg)
Public Key : h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q)
Encryption : e = φ~ h+ [m+H(m, [φ~ h]p)XN−k +G([φ~ h]p)]p] (mod q),
where φ ∈ L(dφ, dφ) and m ∈ Pp(N − k)
Decryption : Compute a ≡ f ~ e (mod q) where the coefficients of a are in the interval
]− q/2, q/2].
Compute t ≡ f−1p ~ a (mod p).
Compute b ≡ e− t (mod p) and c ≡ t−G(b) (mod p).
Write c in the form c = c′ + c′′XN−k with
deg(c′) < N − k and deg(c′′) < k.
If c′′ ≡ H(c′, b) (mod p), c′ is the message m.
If not, a decryption error has occurred.
Current NTRUEncrypt
Naturally, the NTRU cryptosystem has undergone many changes over time, as we can for exam-
ple witness in [18]. For completing this description of the NTRU cryptosystem, we present the
actual parameter settings, key creation, encryption and decryption proceedings given in [18].
However, in the next chapter we only will focus on the first versions of the NTRU cryptosystem,
described in the previous sections. Nevertheless, making this section seems appropriate, at least
for showing the current state of art of NTRU.
Throughout this section we consider p = 3 and q a power of 2. We set the notation:
TN = {trinary polynomials} ⊆ RN
TN (d, e) =
{
trinary polynomials with exactly
d ones and e minus ones
}
⊆ TN
PN (d1, d2, d3) =
{
A1 ~A2 +A3 : Ai ∈ TN (di, di)
}
⊆ TN
The private key is going to be (f, g) = (1+pF, g), where F ∈ PN (d1, d2, d3) and g ∈ TN (dg+1, dg)
are randomly chosen. In order to build the public key, we must require that f = 1 + pF is
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invertible modulo q, which happens for a suitable choice of parameters. Choosing polynomials
of the form A1 ~A2 +A3 comes from efficiency reasons, since it allows fast multiplications.
Algorithm 6: NTRUEncrypt Key Generation
Input: NTRUEncrypt parameters N, p, q, d1, d2, d3, dg
Output: Private key (f, g) and Public key (1, h)
1 repeat
2 F ← PN (d1, d2, d3)
3 f = 1 + pF ∈ RN,q
4 until f is invertible in RN,q
5 g ← TN (dg + 1, dg)
6 h = f−1q ~ g ∈ RN,q
To prevent combinatorial attacks, such as meet-in-the-middle attacks, we maximize the key space
taking dg = bN/3e and 2d1d2 + d3 ≈ N/3, since the expected number of non-zero coefficients in
f is 4d1d2 + 2d3.
In order to encrypt a message M ∈ {0, 1}l, we consider three supporting functions: an invertible
message formatting function FMT, a blinding polynomial generation function BGF and a mask
generation function MGF:
FMT : Message× Random bits −→ TN
BGF : Message× Random bits× Public key −→ PN (d1, d2, d3)
MGF : RN,q −→ TN
The following algorithms instruct how to encrypt and decrypt. The details can be found in [8]
and [14], and an implementation in [37].
Algorithm 7: NTRUEncrypt Encryption
Input: Public key h, message M ∈ {0, 1}l and a parameter set with p = 3
Output: Ciphertext c
1 repeat
2 b← {0, 1}t
3 m′ = FMT(M, b)
4 r′ = BGF(m′, b, h)
5 r = pr′ ~ h
6 mask = MGF(r)
7 m = m′ +mask (mod p)
8 until The number of +1,−1 and 0 in m are each ≥ dm
9 c = r +m
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Algorithm 8: NTRUEncrypt Decryption
Input: Key pair ((f, g), (1, h)), ciphertext c ∈ RN,q and a parameter set with p = 3
Output: result
1 m = f ~ c (mod p)
2 r = c−m
3 mask = MGF(r)
4 m′ = m−mask (mod p)
5 (M, b) = FMT−1(m′)
6 r′ = BGF(m′, b, h)
7 if pr′ ~ h = r and the number of {+1,−1, 0} in m are each ≥ dm then




A new parameter dm is used to assure that decryption has similar difficulty for different results
of m. For more information about the parameter dm, see [14].
Finally, in the following table also given in [14] we give the recommended parameter settings
for this version of NTRUEncrypt and the security estimates for each set of parameters. The
security estimate is essentially the number of steps needed for an attacker to break a private
key or a message. In Section 4.2.2 we explicitly compute some examples. The decryption failure
probability for each set of parameters is residual.
Parameter Sets and Security Estimates
Security estimate N q d1 d2 d3 dg dm
116 401 2048 8 8 6 133 101
133 439 2048 9 8 5 146 112
193 593 2048 10 10 8 197 158
256 743 2048 11 11 15 247 204
3.3.3 The LWE-Based Cryptosystem
The LWE-Based cryptosystem was presented in 2005 by Regev together with a theoretical se-
curity proof, unlike both GGH and NTRU. As previously stated, this kind of cryptosystem is
mostly impractical, but this is not the case. This is why this cryptosystem is inescapable when
studying lattice-based cryptography. In Scheme 4 we describe the cryptosystem.
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Scheme 4: The LWE-based public-key cryptosystem
Parameters : Integers n,m, l, t, r, q and a real α > 0.
The parameter n is the main security parameter.
Private Key: A matrix S ∈ Zn×lq chosen uniformly at random.
Public Key : A pair (A,P = AS + E) ∈ Zm×nq × Zm×lq where A ∈ Zm×nq is chosen
uniformly at random and E ∈ Zm×lq is chosen with entries according to
Ψα, which is a distribution on Zq defined as
Ψα = bXe (mod q),








Encryption : The ciphertext is (u = ATa, c = P Ta+ f(v)) ∈ Znq × Zlq, where v ∈ Zlt is
the message to encrypt, (A,P ) is the public key, a ∈ {−r,−r + 1, . . . , r}m
is chosen uniformly at random and
f : Zlt → Zlq










Decryption : Compute f−1(c− STu), where (u, c) ∈ Znq ×Zlq is the ciphertext, S ∈ Zn×lq
is the private key and
f−1 : Zlq → Zlt










Notice that f−1 defined by this way is not necessarily the inverse of f , it
is just a notation.
The learning with errors problem (LWE) can be described in the following way: given n,m, q ∈ Z,
a probability distribution χ on Zq (usually a rounded normal distribution) and a pair (A, v) ∈
Zm×nq × Zmq , find with some non-negligible probability if v was chosen uniformly from Zmq or
chosen as v = As+ e, where s ∈ Znq is uniformly chosen and e ∈ Zmq is chosen according to χm.
Using the same notation as in Section 3.1, the LWE problem can be reformulated in the following
way: find if v was chosen uniformly from Zmq or chosen by the perturbation (according to χ) of
an arbitrary lattice point in Lq(A).
Currently, no polynomial time algorithm is known for solving the LWE problem, yet there are
some algorithms for solving it in exponential time. The next thing to do is to perceive what
parameters should we take in order to ensure the efficiency and security of the cryptosystem,
not forgetting the probability of decryption errors.
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Efficiency
Following the instructions of the LWE-based cryptosystem in Scheme 4, we can observe that
this is a cryptosystem easy to implement. The following table summarizes the LWE operating
characteristics in terms of its parameters (all logarithms are base 2):
Private key size nl log q bits
Public key size m(n+ l) log q bits
Message size l log t bits





log q/ log t






Operations for decryption per bit Õ(n)
As we can see in the table, the LWE-based cryptosystem has a weakness: the length of the
public-key.
Decryption errors
Like all probabilistic encryption schemes, it is important to study the probability of decryption
errors depending on the chosen parameters. By the description of the LWE-based cryptosystem,
we have
f−1(c− STu) = f−1(P Ta+ f(v)− STATa)
= f−1((AS + E)Ta+ f(v)− STATa)
= f−1(ETa+ f(v)).
Now we will estimate the probability of a single letter of v ∈ Zt get wrongly decrypted. Without
generality loss, we consider the first letter of v.
Let x ∈ Zt be the first coordinate of ETa. In order to get a decryption error in v, we must
have |x| > q2t . Now suppose that a is fixed. Since the entries of E are defined according to Ψα









since the sum of independent normal variables is a normal distribution with mean the sum of
means and variance the sum of variances.
We now estimate the value of ||a|| =
√
a21 + · · ·+ a2m. For that, we compute the expected value










1Also known as message expansion or ciphertext expansion.






































where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution
N (0, 1).
Security
The security guarantee is divided in two pieces. Given the difficulty and the irrelevancy of this
part for the purposes of this work, we will not explain in detail the security analysis of the
LWE-based cryptosystem.
Since the LWE-based cryptosystem is based on the hardness of the LWE problem, we must
choose parameters n,m, q,Ψα for which the LWE problem is believed to be hard. With this
choice of parameters, the public keys (A,P ) generated by the LWE-based cryptosystem are
indistinguishable from arbitrary uniform pairs. This is essentially the first part. The second one
consists to ensure that no statistical information about the encrypted message can be obtained
if one encrypts with a random public key (A,P ).
Since the encrypted message is (ATa, P Ta+ f(v)) ∈ Znq ×Zlq, the second part consists to ensure
that (ATa, P Ta) is uniformly distributed. For this to happen, in [2] it is suggested to choose
parameters verifying
(2r + 1)m  qn+l.
For the first part, we use the reformulation of the LWE problem using lattices, where χ = bΨαe.
To see if v is close to the lattice Lq(A), we can use the dual lattice of Lq(A) and see if 〈v, w〉
is close to an integer for a short vector w ∈ Lq(A). If v = x + e with x ∈ L and e some small
perturbation,




|〈e, w〉| ≤ ‖e‖‖w‖,
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so 〈v, w〉 is close to an integer, namely 〈x,w〉, if e is small, i.e., v is close to L. However, this
method is not very effective when the perturbation vector is of norm much bigger than 1/||w||.
Given that the perturbation vector follows a normal distribution of standard deviation αq/
√
2π,



























In order to guarantee security, the parameters of the cryptosystem must satisfy the two condi-
tions:












log q/ log t will be very large, so we
have to discard this option. Choosing l = n gives an acceptable balance between the encryp-
tion blowup factor and the public key size, which was the primary weakness of the LWE-based
cryptosystem.
In order to choose a good set of parameters, we first set n,m, q, thus set α satisfying the second
condition above, and finally set r satisfying the first equation. As said before, we take l = n.
After that, it only remains to choose t. We highlight that the choice of parameters should
not only guarantee security, but also optimize the operating characteristics of LWE. Further
optimizations of the LWE cryptosystem can be found in [2].
Chapter 4
Analysis of NTRU Cryptosystem
4.1 Security Analysis
RSA may be attacked by factoring, so, to be secure, sufficiently large integers must be used so as
to make factoring infeasible. Similarly, the most effective attacks against NTRU use algorithms
that find short vectors in a lattice, so a NTRU cryptosystem must use parameters sufficiently
large so as to make infeasible to find short vectors.
We begin by describing some elementary attacks, then we give a detailed description of the
lattice attacks. We emphasize that some of the presented attacks do not work anymore with
the current implementation of NTRU, e.g. the current implementation of NTRU is resistant to
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, and thus decryption failure attacks such as the presented
below will not work anymore.
We will work with the original NTRU cryptosystem as it is presented in [15], thus forgetting
the parameter k and the generating and hash functions G and H, all introduced before. Many
other attacks exist, but we present the best known and important ones.
4.1.1 Implementation considerations
When we introduced the NTRU cryptosystem, we defined the parameters p and q as positive
integers satisfying gcd(p, q) = 1. Let us observe why this assumption is very important for the
security of the cryptosystem. Suppose that gcd(p, q) = d. Since
e ≡ φ~ h+m (mod q)
≡ pφ~ f−1q ~ g +m (mod q),
we have that
q | (e− pφ~ f−1q ~ g −m)
and thus
e− pφ~ f−1q ~ g −m = qk
53
54 4.1. SECURITY ANALYSIS
for some integer k. Hence







φ~ f−1q ~ g
)
,
and thus d|(e −m) and e ≡ m (mod d). Therefore reducing e modulo d allows an attacker to
gather valuable information about the message m. Thus, it is important to make d as small as
possible. In the worst case, when d = p, i.e., when d|p, e ≡ m (mod p), which means that an
attacker gets exactly the message m, making the cryptosystem completely insecure.
In addition, it is highly advised to choose N prime, since if N is composite, an attacker can
recover the private key by solving a lattice problem in dimension lower than 2N . For example,
if N is even, we factorize XN − 1 as
XN − 1 = (XN/2 − 1)(XN/2 + 1)












Since the public key h is in Z[X]/〈XN − 1〉, we consider p1(h) and p2(h) and the associated
lattices defined in Section 4.1.9, say L1 and L2. If we can find private keys f1 and f2 associ-
ated to L1 and L2 respectively, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we get a private key
f ∈ Z[X]/〈XN − 1〉. Hence, if N is even, an attacker can recover the private key by solving a
lattice problem of dimension N , and if N/2 is again even, an attacker can recover the private
key by solving a lattice problem of dimension N/4.
Of course this argument is extensible to the case when N is composite. We cannot factorize
XN − 1 as simple as the case when N is even, but we can use the identity




where Φd(X) is the d-th cyclotomic polynomial.
For example,
X15 − 1 = (X − 1)(X2 +X + 1)(X4 +X3 +X2 +X + 1)
(X8 −X7 +X5 −X4 +X3 −X + 1).
4.1.2 Invertibility in truncated polynomial rings
Let us denote by R∗N,q the group of invertible elements of RN,q, i.e.,
R∗N,q = {f ∈ RN,q : f ~ g = 1 for some g ∈ RN,q}.
Since the NTRU cryptosystem uses invertible polynomials modulo p and q, for efficiency reasons
it is important to guarantee that most polynomials in RN,p and RN,q are invertible. Thus we
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will study the ratio #R∗N,q/#RN,q for an arbitrary positive integer q.
The first thing to notice is that we can reduce this problem to the case when q is a power of a
prime. This is due to the Chinese Remainder Theorem: if q = q1q2 with gcd(q1, q2) = 1, then
RN,q ∼= RN,q1 ×RN,q2 and R∗N,q ∼= R∗N,q1 ×R
∗
N,q2 .
Theorem 7. Let p be a prime number, q a power of p, and N ≥ 2 an integer such that
gcd(p,N) = 1.




































This theorem and its proof can be found in [42]. Notice also that the function µ in the theorem
is the classical Möbius function.
Now consider the evaluation map
ev1 : RN,q → Zq
f(X) 7→ f(1).
It is a ring homomorphism, so it induces a group homomorphism
R∗N,q → Z∗q .
We know that
Z∗q ∼= {a ∈ Zq : gcd(a, q) = 1},
so if gcd(f(1), q) 6= 1, then f(1) is not invertible in Zq. Using Proposition 5 of Chapter 3, we
conclude that if f is invertible in RN,q, then gcd(f(1), q) = 1.
Since f ∈ L(df +1, df ), we have f(1) = 1, so we will study the ratio #R∗N,q(1)/#RN,q(1), where
RN,q(1) = {f ∈ RN,q : f(1) = 1} and R∗N,q(1) = {f ∈ R∗N,q : f(1) = 1}.
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−1#R∗N,q (where φ is Euler’s totient


















≈ 1− N − 1
npn
.
Therefore, fixing N prime and a small value for p, namely p = 2 or p = 3, in order to maximize
the above ratio n must be large, i.e., the order of p in ZN must be large. Since p ∈ Z∗N whose
order is φ(N) = N−1, the order of p divides N−1. Thus it is suggested to choose N prime such
that N − 1 has not many divisors. This suggests the use of Sophie Germain primes. Taking a
Sophie Germain prime M , we choose N = 2M + 1 which is prime (by the definition of a Sophie
Germain prime), and consequently N − 1 has as divisors {1, 2,M, 2M}. Hence if N - p2 − 1,
then the order of p in ZN is M or 2M .
If N = 2M + 1 ≥ 167, where M is a Sophie Germain prime, and p ∈ {2, 3}, then it is clear that
the order of p in ZN is M or 2M . Therefore,
#R∗N,q(1)
#RN,q(1)
≈ 1− N − 1
MpM
=





Since usually N ≥ 167, we have M ≥ 83, so this ratio is extremely close to 1.
4.1.3 Wrap and gap failures
We define, for a polynomial f ∈ RN ,










(fi − µf )2
)1/2






The value |f |∞ is called the width or the spread of f . Since the standard deviation of the
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we conclude that |f |2/
√
N is the standard deviation of the coefficients of f .
Remark 6. We can easily check that | |2 and | |∞ are both seminorms, but not norms.








Prob(γ1|f |2|g|2 ≤ |f ~ g|∞ ≤ γ2|f |2|g|2) > 1− ε.
Remark 7. In this proposition, given in [13] and [15], it is clear that f, g ∈ RN are taken
randomly with coefficients in [−r, r] ∩ Z with a large r, since a uniform probability distribution
over the integers does not exist. This proposition is relevant since for somewhat large values of
N and very small values of ε the ratio γ2/γ1 is not very high. If it were not so, the proposition
the estimation of |f ~ g|∞ would be weak.
With this new notation, if f ∈ Lf (df + 1, df ), g ∈ Lg(dg, dg) and φ ∈ Lφ(dφ, dφ), we have
|f |2 =
√





Following the decryption scheme, we must have
|f ~m+ pφ~ g|∞ < q,
since otherwise the coefficients of f ~m+ pφ~ g do not certainly lie in the interval ]− q/2, q/2].
Taking
|f ~m|∞ ≤ q/4 and |pφ~ g|∞ ≤ q/4,
the previous equation holds since | |∞ is a seminorm and because of that the triangular inequality
holds. Using Proposition 6 (with ε very small), we must take
|f |2|m|2 ≈ q/4γ2 and |φ|2|g|2 ≈ q/4pγ2.
For N = 107, N = 167 and N = 503, our experiments led to γ2 values 0.89, 0.72 and 0.44
respectively. These values were obtained by programming Proposition 6 and they are different
from the ones given in [13] and [15].
The following proposition describes a set of parameters that prevent decryption errors.
Proposition 7. Consider the NTRU parameters N, p, q, df , dg, dφ. If q > (6d + 1)p, where
d = df = dg = dφ, then no decryption error can occur.
Proof. Consider the polynomial pφ ~ g + f ~m ∈ RN . For a decryption error never to occur,
we must ensure that the coefficients of this polynomial lie in the interval ] − q/2, q/2]. By the
definition of the convolution product ~, the largest possible coefficient of φ ~ g is 2d. By the
same reason, since the coefficients of m are between −12p and
1
2p, the largest possible coefficient
of f ~m is (2d+ 1) · 12p. Then the largest possible coefficient of pφ~ g + f ~m is
p · 2d+ (2d+ 1) · 1
2
p = p · 1
2
(6d+ 1).
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Thus, as q > (6d+ 1)p, we get that every coefficient of pφ~ g+ f ~m is < q/2. This argument
is also valid for the least possible coefficient of pφ~ g + f ~m.
Remark 8. Since in the above proposition we did a rough estimate for the coefficients of φ~ g
and f ~m, we can actually choose q slightly smaller than (6d + 1)p, and this allows to reduce
key sizes. However, to choose q significantly smaller than (6d+ 1)p it is important to study the
probability of a decryption failure. This probability must be null or residual, say 2−80 or less.
Notice that, if settled a NTRU scheme, Bob works as a decryption oracle, telling to everyone
who sends a message to him if the message was decrypted correctly or was considered invalid.
Then, it is possible to make an attack directed to Bob’s private key through chosen ciphertexts
sent to him, expecting a decryption failure to occur. To produce such an attack, Eve tries
different pairs (m,φ) until her message gets rejected. Suppose that the pair (m,φ) produces a








is not in the interval ] − q/2, q/2]. It is important to remark that Eve does not know i. Now
suppose that p = 3 and choose j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
• Supposing that mj = ±1 and Eve changes it to 0, creating a new message m′, if the pair
(m′, φ) produces a valid decryption then fi−j = ±1.
This is because if fi−j = 0, then the new ci is equal to the old ci, and thus the new pair
(m′, φ) produces an invalid decryption, which is a contradiction.
• If (m,φ) produces a valid decryption with mj = 0 but not with mj = ±1, by the same
argument as in the previous item we have fi−j = ±1.
Therefore this attack can reveal important information about Bob’s private key, specially when
p = 2. It is thus a good practice to make the chance of a decryption error residual or null.
We can study the chance of getting wrap and gap failures by testing a large number of polyno-
mials a = pφ~ g + f ~m (mod q). Running such experimentation, we can have an idea of the
probability of a wrap failure. However, gap failures are so rare that even testing a large number
of polynomials they may not show. If it happens, one can use the following formula, which is
self-explanatory, to estimate the probability of a gap failure:













{ai} = j − q
)
.






(107, 3, 64) ≈ 2−14 ≈ 2−29
(167, 3, 128) ≈ 2−14 ≈ 2−29
(263, 3, 128) ≈ 2−19 ≈ 2−41
(503, 3, 256) ≈ 2−14 ≈ 2−28
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where m has approximately the same number of zeros, ones and minus ones, and the calculation
of the probability of having a gap failure was computed with the previous formula.
In [47], centering methods and estimate decryption failure probabilities are given, testing the the-
ory for a typical parameter set (N, p, q) = (251, 2, 239), with f = 1+pF , F, g, φ ∈ Z2[X]/〈XN−1〉
with exactly 72 ones and N −72 zeros, m ∈ Z2[X]/〈XN −1〉 with exactly 125 ones and N −125
zeros, together with a centering method given in the same report. The results between theory
and practice show good agreement.
4.1.4 Alternate Private Keys
It is possible that another polynomial than f in RN can work as a private key, hence decrypt
encrypted messages as f can do.
Let f ′ be a rotation of f , i.e., f ′ = Xk ~ f for some integer k. We know that pg ≡ f ~ h
(mod q), thus Xk ~ pg ≡ Xkf ~ h (mod q). Therefore, f ′ can decrypt the same messages as f :
Let g′ = Xk ~ g.
Since pg ≡ f ~ h (mod q), pg′ ≡ f ′ ~ h (mod q).
Assume that we want to decrypt the ciphertext e.
We will compute
a′ ≡ f ′ ~ e (mod q)
≡ f ′ ~ (φ~ h+m) (mod q)
≡ Xk ~ f ~ (φ~ pf−1q ~ g +m) (mod q)
≡ Xk ~ (f ~ φ~ pf−1q ~ g + f ~m) (mod q)
≡ Xk ~ (pφ~ g + f ~m︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
) (mod q)
≡ pφ~ g′ + f ′ ~m (mod q).
Since a′ = Xk ~ a, if all the coefficients of a lie in the interval ]−q/2, q/2], then so do the
coefficients of a′.
Consider now f−1p , and its rotation X
−k ~ f−1p .
We compute
(X−k ~ f−1p ) ~ a
′ ≡ X−k ~ f−1p ~ pφ~ g′ +X−k ~ f−1p ~ f ′ ~m (mod q)
≡ m (mod p).
Therefore, we recovered the message m whose ciphertext is e.
In general, any pair (f ′, g′) such that pg′ ≡ f ′ ~ h (mod q) has an inverse modulo p can be
used to decrypt messages if the coefficients of a′ ≡ pφ~ g′ + f ′ ~m (mod q) are in the interval
]−q/2, q/2]. These pairs (f ′, g′) are called alternate keys.
4.1.5 Brute force attacks
As the name implies, this attack consists on testing all possible private keys f, g or all possible
random polynomials φ.
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On the one hand, since g ∈ L(dg, dg) has small coefficients, an attacker can try all possible poly-
nomials f ∈ L(df +1, df ) and see if p−1f~h (mod q) has small coefficients. On the other hand,
since f ∈ L(df + 1, df ) has small coefficients, an attacker can also try all possible polynomials
g ∈ L(dg, dg) and see if pg~ h−1 (mod q) has small coefficients. Notice that h may not have an
inverse modulo q.
Besides, since m ∈ Lm has small values, an attacker can try all possible polynomials φ ∈
L(dφ, dφ) and see if e− φ~ h has small coefficients.
By Table 3.1 of Chapter 3, #Lg < #Lf , so the key security is determined by the parameter
set Lg = L(dg, dg). Besides, the message security is determined by Lφ = L(dφ, dφ). The next
presented attacks (meet-in-the-middle attacks) will cut the search spaces Lg and Lφ by the







































The following attack to the private key f was suggested by Andrew Odlyzko, although origi-
nally the attack was directed to φ. It can be found in [20] and is presented on random binary
keys, although this attack can be adapted for other -ary values. Therefore the private key f
has no longer df + 1 ones and df -1’s, but 2df + 1 ones. In [20], it is suggested to suppose
that f has an even number of ones. However, with this assumption, f will not have an inverse
modulo q, which is supposed to be a power of 2. Therefore, for explaining this attack we will
suppose that f, g are binary, f has an odd number d of ones and N−d zeros, and q is a power of 2.
Begin on literally splitting f in half, say f = f1 + f2, where f1 is of length bN/2c and f2 is of
length dN/2e. For example, if f(X) = X6+X5+X4+X3+1, then we get f1(X) = X6+X5+X4
and f2(X) = X
3 + 1.
Next, if f1 has bd/2c ones and f2 has dd/2e ones, we can proceed to next step. If not,
we need to rotate f in order to satisfy this condition. In the example above, this condi-
tion is not satisfied, but the rotations f ′(X) = X2f(X) = X6 + X5 + X2 + X + 1 and
f ′′(X) = X5f(X) = X5 + X4 + X3 + X2 + X of f satisfy it. We can always guarantee
that at least one rotation of f has this property.
The idea of this attack is to search for f in the form f1 + f2, where f1 and f2 satisfy the above
conditions. For this section we will use the description of h given in [15], h ≡ f−1q ~ g (mod q),
instead of h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q), since encryption is not necessary here and since the following
can be easily adapted. Since f ~ h ≡ g (mod q), we have (f1 + f2) ~ h ≡ g (mod q), and then
f1 ~ h ≡ g − f2 ~ h (mod q), so (f1 ~ h)i = {0, 1} − (f2 ~ h)i (mod q) for all i = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Notice that the coefficients of f1 ~ h and f2 ~ h will differ by either 0 or 1 modulo q. If we
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can find f ′ such that f ′ ~ h (mod q) is binary, then we have found at least one rotation of f or
another key that is able to decrypt messages.






polynomials of length bN/2c with exactly bd/2c ones and the rest of its
coefficients equal to zero.
For a fixed k, we put each f1 into a bin [b1 · · · bk] in the following way:
(a) Take the first k coefficients of f1 ~ h (mod q) (in order);
(b) Write them in base 2 (the length of the binary representation must be log2(q), so in
some cases we must add zeros to the left);
(c) Consider the most significant bit of each of these base 2 representations (in order)
and store them in the bin.




(the number of bins superior
than the number of possible f1’s).
For example, suppose that N = 4, q = 8, d = 3, k = 4 and f1 ~ h (mod q) = 7 + 2X +
3X2 + 5X3 + 6X4.
Writing 7 = (111)2, 2 = (010)2, 3 = (011)2, 5 = (101)2, the polynomial f1 will be stored






polynomials of length dN/2e with exactly dd/2e ones and the rest of its
coefficients equal to zero.
For each f2 we need to check if −f2 ~ h corresponds to a bin occupied by a f1.
That means that the leading bits of the first k coefficients of −f2 ~ h (mod q) are equal
to the ones of f1 ~ h (mod q).
We want to find f1 and f2 such that (f1 ~ h)i ≡ {0, 1} − (f2 ~ h)i (mod q). As a result,
we want to check the bins that correspond to −f2 ~ h and also the bins that correspond
to adding ones to any of the coefficients of −f2 ~ h.
For example, consider −f2 ~ h (mod q) = 7 + 2X + 3X2 + 5X3 + 6X4 as in the previous
step. The polynomial f2 will be stored in the bin [1001].
If we add one to seven, we get eight (which is zero modulo 8) and the leading bit changes
from one to zero. If we add one to two, we get three, and the leading bit remains equal
to zero. If we add one to three, we get four, and the leading bit changes from zero to one.
Finally, if we add one to five, we get six and the leading bit remains equal to one.
Therefore, we have to check the bin [1001] and the bins [0001], [1011], [0011] as well.
3. Search for matches
Once we have found that f2 match with an occupied bin, we compute f = f1 + f2 and
check if the coefficients of f ~ h (mod q) are binary.
If it is binary, then the algorithm terminates and we have found a private key.
If it is not binary, then we proceed to the next f2.
If the bin is occupied by more than one f1, then we need to check f2 for each f1 in the
bin.
At this point, we give an example to make this attack clear: consider (N, d, q) = (6, 5, 8),
f(X) = X5 +X3 +X2 +X + 1 and g(X) = X3 +X + 1. Then we define f1(X) = X
5 +X3 and
f2(X) = X
2 +1. The public key is h(X) = f−1q ~g (mod q) = 6X
5 +7X4 +6X3 +6X2 +7X+7.






= 3 polynomials of length 3 with exactly 2 ones and the rest of the
coefficients equal to zero. That is, f1 ∈ {X5 + X4, X5 + X3, X4 + X3}. We will denote these







We choose k = 4 and compute f
(j)
1 ~ h (mod q) for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, following the













= 1 polynomial f2 to list, namely f
(1)
2 = X
2 +X + 1, which will be stored
in the bin [1111].
For step 3, we compute





5 +X4 +X2 +X + 1,





5 +X3 +X2 +X + 1,





4 +X3 +X2 +X + 1.
Then, we compute
f (1) ~ h = 1 +X2 +X5,
f (2) ~ h = 1 +X +X3,
f (3) ~ h = X +X2 +X4.
All of these polynomials are binary, then all of them can be used as private keys. Notice that
f (2) is equal to f . In fact, these three polynomials are rotations of each other.
We now describe the running time of this algorithm. The first important remark to do is that
the expected running time decreases as we increase k, however, increasing k costs increasing
memory use. Following some remarks in [20] we can improve this algorithm, and the final esti-






This attack applies also to the case when the private key f is of the form f = f1 ~ f2, f =
f1 ~ f2 + f3 or f = 1 + pF , where F is binary or takes one of the product forms described by
the two previous cases. The idea is also given in [20].
4.1.7 Multiple transmission attacks
Suppose that Alice sends to Bob the same message r times, i.e., that Alice sends to Bob the r
ciphertexts
ei ≡ φi ~ h+m (mod q), i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
This is a bad practice, since an attacker can recover large parts of the message m. Suppose
that Eve knows that Alice has sent the same message m multiple times, say r times. She then
computes
ci ≡ (ei − e1) ~ h−1 (mod q)
≡ ei ~ h−1 − e1 ~ h−1 (mod q)
≡ φi +m~ h−1 − φ1 −m~ h−1 (mod q)
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≡ φi − φ1 (mod q).
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
Remark 9. Notice again that h may not have an inverse modulo q. However, there exists h′
such that a~ h~ h′ ≡ a (mod q) for all polynomials a satisfying a(1) = 0. This polynomial h′
is called a pseudo-inverse of h, and we can use it in the above calculation.
Since the coefficients of φi−φ1 are between −2 and 2, when Eve computes ci she recovers exactly
φi − φ1, rather than modulo q. For j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, let α, β and γ be the jth coefficient of
φi, φ1 and φi − φ1, respectively. Then, the possible values for γ = α− β are:
β
−1 0 1
−1 0 −1 −2
α 0 1 0 −1
1 2 1 0
Hence Eve can deduce the following:
• If γ = ±2, then β = ∓− 1;
• If γ = ±1, then β ∈ {0,∓1}.
Therefore,
• If γ = ±2, then it is possible to recover more or less 2/9 of the coefficients of φ1;
• If γ = ±1, then it is possible to obtain valuable information about 4/9 of the coefficients
of φ1.
It is then clear that sending the same message, even if a few times, can reveal to an attacker
large parts of φ1. In this fashion Eve can recover large parts of m.
However, for this attack to work, Eve has to know if Alice has sent the same message m multiple
times. This is not an issue, since
(ei − ej) ~ h−1 ≡ (φi − φj) + (mi −mj) ~ h−1 (mod q)
has small coefficients if and only if mi and mj are the same (because φi−φj has small coefficients
and h−1 in general has more dispersed coefficients).
We can find in [17] two ways to prevent multiple transmission attacks.
4.1.8 Semantic security
Recall the ciphertext and public key forms
e ≡ φ~ h+m (mod q),
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h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q).
Since g(1) = dg − dg = 0, we have
h(1) ≡ 0 (mod q).
Therefore,
e(1) ≡ m(1) (mod q)
≡ m0 + · · ·+mN−1 (mod q).
Because of this, an attacker can acquire relevant information about the message m by just
computing e(1).
4.1.9 Lattice-based attacks
Lattice-based attacks are currently the most effective ones against the NTRU cryptosystem.
Lattices are good candidates to make an attack, since the private key f and messages m have
small coefficients. Then, using lattice reduction algorithms such as LLL and BKZ, we may find
private keys (or an alternate keys) or messages. The two first presented attacks (also called
hybrid attacks) are by far the most effective ones, hence they are the main focus of study.
Lattice attack on an NTRU private key
The standard NTRU lattice LNT is defined as the lattice generated by the columns of the matrix
α 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0









0 0 · · · α 0 0 · · · 0
h′0 h
′
N−1 · · · h′1 q 0 · · · 0
h′1 h
′















where h′i ≡ p−1hi (mod q). This matrix is composed by four N×N blocks, so the lattice LNT is
of dimension 2N . In the matrix, α ∈ R is a short parameter to be chosen in order to maximize
the efficiency of lattice reduction algorithms.
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Since h ≡ pf−1q ~ g (mod q), the vector τ = (αf, g) is in the lattice LNT:
α 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0









0 0 · · · α 0 0 · · · 0
h′0 h
′
N−1 · · · h′1 q 0 · · · 0
h′1 h
′



































Therefore, our target vector will be τ = (αf, g), which is a short vector in the lattice LNT. Using






since det(LNT) = αNqN
Hence, lattice reduction algorithms have more chance to find the short vector τ if we maximize
the ratio s/‖τ‖. Since
‖τ‖2 = α2(2df + 1) + 2dg ≈ α2|f |22 + |g|22 = |τ |22,
we have








α2|f |22 + |g|22
Thus, in order to maximize the ratio s/‖τ‖, we maximize
f(α) =
α
α2|f |22 + |g|22
.
Therefore, after computing the derivative of f(α), an attacker must choose
α = |g|2/|f |2 =
√
2dg
2df + 1− 1N
.
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Notice that ch is the inverse of the ratio that we have approximated before. Thus, this value
tells to an attacker how easy the private key can be found: if the ratio ch is small, it will be
easy to find the private key. If ch is close to 1, the private key lattice will be difficult to find.
Since an attacker can compute ch, Bob has to ensure that ch is close to 1.
Lattice attack on an NTRU message
Very similar to a lattice attack on an NTRU private key, we consider the lattice of dimension
2N + 1 generated by the columns of the matrix
α 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0










0 0 · · · α 0 0 · · · 0 0
h0 hN−1 · · · h1 q 0 · · · 0 e0










hN−1 hN−2 · · · h0 0 0 · · · q eN−1
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 1

.
In contrast with a lattice attack on an NTRU private key, this lattice has dimension increased
by 1, so this attack is in general less effective.
The target vector will be (αφ,−m,−1), as
α 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0










0 0 · · · α 0 0 · · · 0 0
h0 hN−1 · · · h1 q 0 · · · 0 e0










hN−1 hN−2 · · · h0 0 0 · · · q eN−1


























Doing the same calculations as before, we can conclude that an attacker must choose α =





tells to him how easy is to find a message: the smaller cm gets, the easier it will be to find the
message. If cm is close to 1, the message will be difficult to find. Thus Alice must choose her
messages in such a way that cm is close to 1.
In conclusion, to make lattice attacks on the private key as difficult as lattice attacks on messa-
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ges, Alice must choose messages (and random polynomials) satisfying cm ≈ ch, i.e., |f |2|g|2 ≈











and by this way Alice is free to choose the messages she wants.
The formulas
|f |2|m|2 ≈ q/4γ2 and |φ|2|g|2 ≈ q/4pγ2
given in Section 4.1.3 can also contribute to the parameter choices.
Lattice attack on a spurious key
This attack, suggested by Coppersmith and Shamir in [6], consists on finding polynomials f ′
that can act as the private key.
If an attacker knows a short vector in the lattice LNT, say τ ′ = (αf ′, g′), then if τ ′ is short
enough, it can be used for decryption purposes, i.e., the polynomial pφ~ g′ + f ′ ~m has coeffi-
cients lying in the interval ]− q/2, q/2] with high probability.
However, experimental evidence suggests that finding spurious keys f ′ takes not much less time
than finding the private key f .
Zero-Run lattices
Since the polynomials f and g have a large number of zeros, and consequently τ = (αf, g) has
a large number of zeros, the following attack, suggested by Alexander May, proposes to take
advantage of this fact.
The attack can be described by the following way:
1. Choose a very large number θ and a positive integer r ≤ 2N − 2df − 2dg − 1;
2. Pick r rows of the matrix of the lattice LNT and multiply them by θ.
The idea is to force lattice reduction algorithms to find short vectors with r-coordinates
equal to 0, since otherwise those coordinates will have very large values, making the vectors
found by the lattice reduction algorithms not to be small;
3. Use a lattice reduction algorithm to find short vectors in the new lattice, hoping to find the
private key f (if one chooses the right r rows of the matrix of the lattice) or an alternate
key.
This attack originally suggested the choice of r consecutive rows, but the key creator can make
sure that the private key f has not a large number of consecutive zeros (anywhere in f , since
a rotation of f can work as an alternate key). It is therefore advised to take r random rows
instead of r consecutive ones.
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Zero-forced lattices
The idea of using zero-forced lattices emerged from zero-run lattice attacks, and are way more
efficient, since the dimension of zero-forced lattices is less than the lattice LNT.
The attack can be described by the following way:
1. Choose a positive integer r ≤ N − 2dg and a set of indexes J = {j1, . . . , jr}, where
0 ≤ j1 < · · · < jr < N .
The idea is to force zeros in g, but one can on the other hand to force zeros in f (though
in general g has more zeros than f) or in both f and g at the same time.
Hence we will search short vectors with J-coordinates equal to 0.






















N−2 + · · · + fN−1h′0 ≡ gN−1 (mod q)






j1−1 + · · · + fN−1h
′






j2−1 + · · · + fN−1h
′












jr−1 + · · · + fN−1h
′
jr−N+1 ≡ 0 (mod q).
Solving this system of congruences for fN−r, . . . , fN−1 and substituting in the first system,
we get the system of congruences{
aj,0f0 + aj,1f1 + · · ·+ aj,N−r−1fN−r−1 ≡ gj (mod q)
for j 6∈ J .
We have solve the system of congruences for fN−r, . . . , fN−1, but we can solve for any
other r variables fi1 , . . . , fir , where 0 ≤ i1 ≤ · · · ≤ ir ≤ N − 1.
3. Now we define the Zero-Forced Lattice
LZFJ =

α 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0




... 0 0 0 0
0 0 · · · α 0 0 0 0
aj′0,0 aj′0,1 · · · aj′0,N−r−1 q 0 · · · 0












· · · aj′N−r−1,N−r−1 0 0 · · · q

,
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where 0 ≤ j′0 < · · · < j′N−r−1 < N and {j′0, . . . , j′N−r−1} = {0, . . . , N − 1} \ J .
This is a lattice of dimension 2(N − r), and notice that the parameter α is in general
different from the one of LNT, i.e., the parameter α must be recomputed.
The target vector is vJ = (αf0, . . . , αfN−r−1, gj′0 , . . . , gj′N−r−1), which will reveal the unk-
nown values gj′0 , . . . , gj′N−r−1 .
Remark 10. If we choose r too large, then J will be too large and the chance of choosing a good
set J will be reduced. More information about zero-forced lattices can be found in [44]. We can
find that this attack, using the lattice LNT together with a zero-forced lattice, is the best attack
against the NTRU cryptosystem. Although in [44] it is remarked that this kind of attack does
not affect too much NTRU with N = 167 (see Table 3.1), currently this NTRU scheme can be
broken in a fair amount of time.
4.2 Practical implementations of NTRU
4.2.1 Theoretical operating specifications
Considering the parameters (N, p, q, k), the NTRU cryptosystem has the following operating
characteristics:
Private Key Size 2N log2 p bits
Public Key Size N log2 q bits
Message Size (N − k) log2 p bits
Ciphertext Size N log2 q bits
Encryption Blowup Factor NN−k logp q
Encryption Speed O(N2) operations
Decryption Speed O(N2) operations
In section 4.3, we make some remarks about the encryption blowup factor (the message expan-
sion) and about both encryption and decryption speeds.
Concerning encryption and decryption speeds, there are way more efficient ways to compute a
product of polynomials f ~ g in RN . The usual and naive method require N2 multiplications,
but since f and g have a large number of zeros, this is a fast multiplication. As suggested in
[45], splitting f and g into two parts can reduce this multiplication to 34N
2 operations. If this
technique is repeated recursively, a smaller constant can be achieved. If N is sufficiently large,
it may be faster to use Fast Fourier Transforms. This multiplication takes then O(N logN)
operations.
4.2.2 Specific parameter choices
Let us focus on the parameters suggested in [13] and [15], presented in section 3.3.2. With the
help of the above table, we analyze the meet-in-the-middle security levels of each parameter set
and compute the lattice values ch, cm and s introduced before. We will write s in function of q
in view of the next section.
We will exclude the parameter set with N = 107, as actually it is easily broken with lattice-based
attacks.
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Moderate Security High Security Highest Security
(N, p, q, k) (167, 3, 128, 49) (263, 3, 128, 52) (503, 3, 256, 107)
(df , dg, dφ) (60, 20, 18) (49, 24, 16) (215, 72, 55)
Private Key Size 530 bits 834 bits 1595 bits
Public Key Size 1169 bits 1841 bits 4024 bits
Message Size 187 bits 335 bits 628 bits
Ciphertext Size 1169 bits 1841 bits 4024 bits
Encryption Blowup Factor 6.25 5.50 6.41
Key Security 282.9 2110.6 2285
Message Security 277.5 282.1 2170
(ch, cm) (0.236, 0.225) (0.187, 0.195) (0.182, 0.160)
s 0.296q 0.409q 0.365q
4.2.3 Lattice attacks - Experimental evidence and remarks
To study the NTRU lattices, we use the BKZ algorithm implemented in the NTL Library [15]
in order to find a very short vector in the lattice LNT. In practice, for the first values of β, BKZ
does not find something better than a q-vector, i.e., a vector with one coordinate = q and the
rest equal to zero. Since the lattice LNT already contains q-vectors, BKZ with small blocksizes
is useless.
The blocksize value needed to pass this threshold, which depends obviously on N and ch, ap-
pears to grow linearly with N , but we have to keep in mind that increasing β will significantly
increase the running time of BKZ. The BKZ simulation algorithm is helpful to find an optimal
trade-off between running time and quality of reduction.
When this threshold is passed, BKZ finds very short vectors in LNT. If the current blocksize β
does not allow to find a vector with length ≈ s, then the following β + 1 has a good chance of





is lesser than q, but not much lesser, hence after the threshold is passed there is a good chance
of BKZ to find a vector in LNT with length ≈ s.
With this, the BKZ algorithm can either output a very short vector in LNT or a q-vector which
is useless. This allows to conclude that spurious keys are rare to find, since either we got a
q-vector or a very short vector that can be the private key. This is why spurious keys do not
constitute a threat to NTRU.
As observed in [15], [19] and [30], letting t(N) denote the necessary time to find the private
key of an NTRU setting with parameter N , the graph of log(t(N)) seems to be, in average,
something like a line with positive slope and some small positive concavity. This suggests that
t(N) grows at least exponentially with N , possibly with N logN .
Remark 11. It is implied that t(N) is not a function, since there are multiple NTRU settings
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with the same main parameter N . For a fixed N , we consider some NTRU parameters and
compute t(N), which may vary a lot. Doing this for all (or some) reasonable N , we obtain a
graph that consists in a cloud of points, which has the shape of a line with positive slope and
small positive concavity.
In order to extrapolate t(N) for larger values of N , we use linear regression to find constants
a, b such that log(t(N)) ≈ aN + b. Such constants can be found in [15], [19] and [30].
Therefore, it remains an open problem how to break NTRU keys with large N in feasible time.
4.3 Additional topics
4.3.1 Improving message expansion
The parameter settings given in Sections 3.3.2 and 4.2.2 lead to somewhat large message expan-
sions (namely between 5-to-1 and 7-to-1). It is thus important to find techniques that allow to
suppress this weakness of NTRU.
There is a simple way to reduce the encryption blowup factor logp(q) of NTRU. Instead of
considering a message with coefficients between −(p − 1)/2 and (p − 1)/2, Alice chooses a
message with coefficients in ] − q/2, q/2] (in particular, trinary messages can be chosen). She
randomly chooses φ1 ∈ Lφ and a polynomial φ2 with coefficients between −(p−1)/2 and (p−1)/2
and computes the quantities
e2 ≡ φ2 ~ h+m (mod q)
e1 ≡ φ1 ~ h+ φ2 (mod q)
and send (e1, e2) to Bob. The intention is to make φ2 playing the message role. Hence, Bob can
recover φ2, and therefore can also recover
m ≡ e2 − φ2 ~ h (mod q).
With this, the encryption blowup factor is reduced to 2 (although the ciphertext size is doubled).
4.3.2 Comparison with other cryptosystems
In this section we will compare some operating characteristics of well-known classical encryption
schemes with the lattice-based ones. More specifically, we will compare NTRU, RSA, McEliece,
GGH and ECC.
McEliece cryptosystem was developed by Robert McEliece in 1978, and is based on coding the-
ory. In what concerns encryption and decryption, this cryptosystem is very fast when compared
with ECC and RSA, but both private and public keys have large sizes, making it difficult to
be used in practice. Despite of this, this cryptosystem is important since it is quantum-resistant.
The ciphertext form of the McEliece cryptosystem is of the form E = AM + Y where A is the
public key, M is the message and Y is a random element. The NTRU encryption can also be
















with the parameter α in LNT equal to 1. Therefore, we observe that encrypting with NTRU is
very similar to encrypting with McEliece, with random element and message exchanged.
The decryption procedure with NTRU is very different from all other decryption methods. Both
McEliece and GGH decrypt by eliminating some small random perturbation, but NTRU has
ciphertext form e ≡ φ~h+m (mod q), so decryption eliminates the contribution φ~h (mod q)
which is in general not small. In addition, RSA and NTRU show almost nothing in common.
One advantage of NTRU is the length of both public and private keys, which produces a clear
distinction with GGH (and McEliece of course). If a GGH lattice has dimension d, then key
sizes are O(d2). If a NTRU lattice has dimension d, then the private key size is O(d) and the
public key size is O(d log d). Hence NTRU produces significantly smaller private and public keys
than GGH, the size of whose public and private keys make the cryptosystem impractical when
d is sufficiently large.
To be clear, we present the following table, suggested in [14], where we can find the operating
features of the compared cryptosystems above, together with ECC. In the table, N is the main
security parameter or the message length.
NTRU RSA McEliece GGH ECC
Encryption Speed 1 N2 N2 N2 N2 N3
Decryption Speed 2 N2 N3 N2 N2 N3
Public Key N N N2 N2 N
Private Key N N N2 N2 N
Message Expansion 3 varies 1-1 2-1 1-1 2-1
As verified in [22], regarding key sizes, ECC is always better than NTRU and RSA for security
levels greater than 80 bits. Still about key sizes, under a security level of 160 bits RSA is better
than NTRU, but for greatest security levels NTRU has a better performance than RSA. We
point that the minimum security level considered as strong security is 80 bits. Keys that have
a security level of 128 bits are recommended because they offer more security.
Regarding key generation, encryption and decryption (for the same security levels), the per-
formance of NTRU is better than RSA. NTRU is also much faster than ECC with all levels
of security in terms of key generation, encryption and decryption. However, McEliece is faster
than NTRU regarding encryption and decryption times.
1RSA encryption is O(N3) unless small encryption exponents are used.
2NTRU encryption and decryption are asymptotically O(N logN) using FFTs.
3For NTRU, see sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. For McEliece, it is usually between 1.25 and 1.5.
Chapter 5
Prospect of Future Works
In this chapter we present a simple idea for a quantum algorithm that we have developed, but
due to time issues we could not analyze it in detail. Besides, we briefly mention some topics of
work to be done in the future that could contribute both for lattice reduction attacks and other
attacks for NTRU cryptosystem.
The quantum algorithm that we present can be done with various polynomial time lattice re-
duction algorithms, but to ease writing we only point the LLL algorithm, whose implementation
is found almost everywhere (NTL, Sage and Mathematica, for example).
The major benefit of this quantum algorithm is the superposition of all possible vectors written
with a certain amount of memory, then run the LLL algorithm for a lattice of basis B together





| 0 〉 | 0⊕ LLL(B)〉
Fig. 5.1: LLL algorihtm as a quantum circuit. Note that in first set of wires we prepare the input basis
B. On the second set we store the answer, which is xored with the initial value of the second set of





| 0 〉 | 0⊕ LLL(B ∪ {v}) 〉
Fig. 5.2: Extension of the LLL algorithm as a quantum circuit where we consider an extra set of wires





LLL+| 0 〉 H
| 0 〉
Fig. 5.3: Finally, we use the extended LLL with uniform superposition of all possible vectors. The
uniform superposition is made with a Hadamard gate, creating all possible vectors written with a
certain finite amount of memory. Then we run the extended LLL algorithm and measure the answer.
The idea is that, given a basis B of a lattice L, try all possible linear combinations of the vectors
that generate L. This is thus a quantum brute force search.
We first define an interval where the coefficients of the linear combination will be, such as
{−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The cardinality of this interval must be a power of 2. It is very im-
portant to make this interval somewhat centered, as for example, if these coefficients were all
positive then we would never get a shorter vector than the ones that we already know.
In general, if the lattice L is of dimension n and if we choose the length of the above interval
to be equal to 2m, then we get exactly 2mn vectors. With this, we do the superposition of all
these vectors, apply the LLL+ algorithm to this superposition, and finally measure the answer.
The next step is to study the probability of this algorithm giving a useful answer. Of course,
this algorithm can be done in a classical computer, although the running time would be expo-
nential in the length of the chosen interval (and also in the dimension of the lattice), making it
impractical, as we have to apply LLL to all vectors individually. Choosing a polynomial time
reduction algorithm is also important. However, choosing for example the BKZ algorithm, we
can abort the search after a certain amount of time and measure the answer.
Another perspective is to try to reduce lattice problems to other ones that can be efficiently
dealt by a quantum computer, such as problems involving period finding, that can be dealt with
QFTs, as it is done in [28]. On the other hand, to study in more depth classical lattice attacks
in random lattices and lattices of a special form. The aim is to find new and more effective
lattice attacks, for both random lattices and lattices of a special form, such as the NTRU lattice
LNT .
A subject to certainly explore is the family of NTRU, that is, some variants of the NTRU cryp-
tosystem. NTRU is based on the ring RN = Z[X]/〈XN − 1〉, and the following table given in
[49] summarizes some variants and the associated rings.
ETRU is based on the ring Z[ω][X]/〈XN − 1〉 where Z[ω] is the ring of Eisenstein integers.
The Eisenstein integers are the complex numbers of the form z = a + bω, where a, b ∈ Z and
ω = e2πi/3. The Eisenstein integers form a triangular lattice in the complex plane.
QTRU is based on quaternion algebra and the associated ring is OQ[X]/〈XN − 1〉, where
OQ = Z · 1⊕ Z · i⊕ Z · j ⊕ Z · k.
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NTRU Prime [3] introduce rings of the form Z[X]/〈Xp−X − 1〉, where p is a prime number. It
was proposed by Daniel Bernstein, Tanja Lange et al. in May 2016.
Variant of NTRU Ring
ETRU Z[ω][X]/〈XN − 1〉, ω = e2πi/3
QTRU OQ[X]/〈XN − 1〉
CTRU F2[T ][X]/〈XN − 1〉
pNE Z[X]/〈X2N + 1〉
NTWO Z[X,Y ]/〈XN − 1, Y N − 1〉






NNRU Zm×m[X]/〈XN − Im〉
NTRU Prime Z[X]/〈Xp −X − 1〉, p prime
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